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Abstract 
 
The current paper investigates why persistent differences exist among countries 
in their ability to pursue disciplined fiscal policy. It contributes to the literature that 
emphasizes the importance of multidisciplinary approach in understanding economic 
phenomena. An existing theory - that focuses primarily on old EU member states – is 
used as framework. In the first part of the paper the theory’s general applicability to the 
Central and Eastern European Region is tested. In line with the framework theory’s 
suggestion, evidence from 10 Central and Eastern European countries shows that in the 
absence of extreme external factors, that would push governments towards fiscal 
restraint, the key to persistent fiscal discipline is a favorable institutional setting 
(adequate fiscal rules). It primarily depends on certain domestic political and social 
factors whether this institutional setting is created in a country. The framework theory 
emphasizes the importance of consensus within the elite and diffuse support in the 
society towards the political system. In the second part the cases of Estonia and 
Hungary (the two extremes of fiscal performance in the region) are compared and the 
results support the validity of the above suggestions. Nevertheless the theory has major 
shortcomings in the operationalization of diffuse support, which is essential for general 
applicability. Based on the results of the case comparison the current paper suggests that 
focusing on attitudes regarding the previous political system is a promising direction for 
further research on the operationalization of diffuse support as far as post-communist 
transition countries are concerned.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. The goal and relevance of the research 
 
The issue of budget deficits and more generally fiscal policy has central 
importance in economic discourse. The provision regarding budget balance forms a 
crucially important part of the European Monetary Union’s Maastricht criteria and the 
fact that precisely this element seems to cause the biggest problem for most member 
states and that this issue is so widely discussed certainly underlines its importance. At 
the same time it is a rather controversial topic that has sparked endless debates. What is 
the right fiscal policy to conduct? What level of budget deficit is still acceptable? How 
to determine sustainability in fiscal policy? What is the best way to measure deficits? 
What is the best way to finance deficits? These are only examples of the questions 
economists have been trying to clarify. Nevertheless it seems to be clear that 
persistently high budget deficit is harmful for the economy thus – at least on the long-
run – it has a negative effect on the wellbeing of the society. Most recently the Greek 
crisis has drawn attention to the dangers of profligate fiscal policy, where years of 
overspending created an enormous debt pile whose weight now seems to crush the 
economy. The current topicality of fiscal policy certainly makes research about the 
underlying reasons of budget deficits relevant. The motivation behind this paper lies 
however not in current Greek or world events, rather in another negative example: the 
case of Hungary demonstrates well the long-term problems that persistently high budget 
deficit can cause.  
Hungary has been a front runner in the political and economic transition 
throughout the ‘90s yet development has clearly lost steam in recent years. In many 
respect Hungary has fallen from the position of being “the best performer in the class” 
to the bottom of the group of transition countries. High budget deficit, although to a 
 5 
varying degree, has constantly been a major macroeconomic problem of Hungary 
during the past two decades of transition. As the country’s worsening performance - 
particularly vis-à-vis other transition countries in the region - became more and more 
obvious the deficit problem received increased attention from economists, as well as 
politicians, journalists and the public. In 2008 a group of leading experts has conducted 
a widely debated study to identify the causes of problems in the Hungarian economy 
and to provide policy recommendations. The conclusion of the study – in a somewhat 
simplified way - was that the economy is trapped in a vicious circle where the pressure 
induced by high budget deficit pushes governments to raise taxes (mainly on labor) 
which then suffocates the labor market and slows economic growth. Without substantial 
economic growth in turn it is impossible to lower the high budget deficit. (Barabás et al 
[2008]) While it was not the authors’ aim to reduce explanation of all problems to one 
single factor, nevertheless an important conclusion of the study is that - through the 
above mechanism – persistently high budget deficit substantially reduces the economy’s 
mid- and long-term growth potential. From a Hungarian perspective therefore it is a 
highly relevant question why certain transition countries managed to maintain fiscal 
restraint while Hungary has been persistently pursuing lax fiscal policies. 
Although it might seem that budget deficit and fiscal policy are issues where 
economics has the first and foremost relevance, a purely economic approach is often 
insufficient to explain the true reasons behind differences in fiscal performance of 
countries. Therefore the current research uses an existing theory as framework wherein 
the political and social aspects are given priority in examining potential determinants of 
fiscal performance. The goal of the research is twofold: 
 
(1) Applying the theory to the cases of Hungary and Estonia to identify social and 
political factors that influence persistent differences of the two countries in their 
fiscal performance. The results shall be used to alter and suggest amendments to 
the theory. (2) At the same time the theory’s applicability to the Central and 
Eastern European transition countries will be tested in order to prepare ground 
for further research in this direction. 
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The aim is not to come up with a holistic explanation for such complex issue as budget 
deficit or fiscal policy. Clearly for that goal a much wider focus is required and a much 
greater number of factors need to be taken into consideration. Instead the current paper 
investigates how budget deficit and fiscal policy is connected to areas that are not in the 
focus of economists, but still can provide valuable information for better understanding 
the nature of fiscal policy and deficits. It is certainly not implied that factors outside the 
focus of this research are irrelevant, rather the goal is to prove that issues discussed here 
are also highly relevant. 
For the purpose of the current research fiscal performance is defined as the level 
of general government budget deficit (or surplus), that is general government’s net 
borrowing (or net lending). Data provided by the European Commission will be used, 
primarily.  Central and Eastern European transition countries include the 10 new 
European Union member states that joined in 2004 and 2007, that is Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania and 
Bulgaria.  The time period in focus is the period of transition up until present days, 
roughly 20 years. The starting point of the transition period varies among the 10 
countries. A convenient starting point could be 1989, the year of major political changes 
in Central Europe. However on one hand many of the countries in question weren’t 
even independent at that time, on the other hand profound changes have occurred 
already prior to 1989 or prior to the date some countries officially gained independence. 
Since comparable, uniform data is only available since 1995, the ambiguity of an exact 
starting point is not a major problem.  
 
 
1.2. Choosing the framework theory 
 
Economists and other social scientists have always struggled to find 
explanations why in certain periods of history certain countries or group of countries 
managed to develop much faster to a much higher level than others. Cases are even 
more curious, where this difference appears between countries that seem to enjoy (or 
suffer) similar initial conditions. Unfortunately it can not be claimed that today we have 
the knowledge to provide exact answers. In retrospect we seem to be able to find the 
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relevant factors behind the success or failure of one or another country, yet future 
predictions even in the medium run are proven to be absolutely wrong far too often.   
It has a long tradition in social sciences to explain such differences in 
development by factors that are outside the focus of classical economics, such as 
history, society, institutional setting, etc. Nils Goldschmidt [2006] has called this the 
cultural approach to economics. Culture has been considered as key factor in economic 
development by such classics as Max Weber, Friedrich Hayek or Joseph Schumpeter. 
From more recent times authors like Francis Fukuyama, Samuel Huntington or Robert 
Putnam can be highlighted as illustrious figures of this approach.  
Another very important scholar is Douglass C. North, who in 1993 received the 
Nobel Prize for his achievements in new institutional economics. In his works North 
deals with the importance of institutions in economic performance. He distinguishes 
two types: formal and informal institutions, the latter being unwritten, social norms, “a 
part of the heritage that we call culture”. His work is particularly relevant for transition 
countries. According to North’s theory the decisive factor in the success of a transition 
is how the imported formal institutions (i.e. market capitalism and liberal democracy) 
interplay with the informal institutions of a given society. (North [2005]) This approach 
has been applied to Central and Eastern Europe by several authors, see for example 
Pejovich [2006], Winiecki [2004], Norkus [2007] or Zweynert and Goldschmidt [2005]. 
All of these works emphasize the cultural background of societies, more precisely 
whether this background is compatible or not with western capitalism, as relevant factor 
that influences the success or failure of these countries in the transition process.    
While this “cultural” approach certainly provides an interesting and valuable additional 
aspect to the study of economic development, workers based on it often lack specificity: 
they provide grandiose explanations, yet fail to explain exactly how, according to what 
mechanisms the proposed factors work or how these factors can be operationalized. 
Therefore they are less useful in research where the goal is to explain more specific 
outcomes. Moreover purely such an approach does not seem to be more successful than 
for instance neoclassical economics in predicting the future development of countries. 
(Here enough to think of Max Weber and the countries that without a Calvinist 
background managed to reach leading position in development.) 
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The goal of the current paper is to explain a very specific outcome: budget 
deficit, more precisely the persistent difference in budget deficit levels between 
countries. Economics (or rather neoclassical economics), the discipline that certainly 
has primary relevance in this issue, is interested largely in the methods how deficit 
should be financed and how these different methods influence the level of deficit. This 
involves issues such as the automatic stabilizers (tax system and unemployment), 
inflation, debt level, government spending, etc. and how changes in these factors 
influence the level of deficit, therefore which one is the economically most 
advantageous option. (See for instance Alesina and Perotti [1996]) It is mostly beyond 
the scope of orthodox economics to explain why certain countries choose the obviously 
inferior ways of financing deficit (e.g. indebtedness), therefore why in certain countries 
high deficit persistently causes problems while it is not the case in others.   
At this point the political economic approach to deficits appears to be helpful which is 
based on the widely accepted notion that fiscal policy is one of the politically most 
sensitive areas of economic policy, therefore one should study the political system 
(party structure, electoral system, etc.) in order to understand differences in fiscal 
performance of countries. Some authors highlight the connection between coalition 
governments and high deficits (for instance Roubini and Sachs [1988]) while others 
emphasize the importance of political business cycles in deficit, i.e. deficits tend to 
increase around elections (Buchanan and Wagner [1977]1 or Soós [2005]). Empirical 
evidence does not seem to support the first approach (countries with high and low 
deficits can be found with both types of governments), while the second approach fails 
to provide explanation to persisting differences between democracies which all face the 
problem of possible budget inflation before elections. The institutionalist approach 
amends the political approach insofar as it emphasizes the importance of fiscal 
institutions in restricting politicians in fiscal discretion: more centralized fiscal rules are 
more favorable for fiscal restrain. (See for example Alesina and Perotti [1994]; 
Hallerberg and von Hagen [1997]; Perotti et al [1998]2; Kopits [2001]) 
The theory chosen for the framework of the current research aims to explain the 
specific problem of persistent difference in fiscal position among certain countries. The 
starting point is an institutionalist approach and the theory agrees that favorable fiscal 
                                                 
1
 Referred to by Gyırffy [2007]  
2
 Referred to by Gyırffy [2007]  
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institutions yield strict fiscal policy. Yet also a further step is taken and it explored why 
certain countries choose to introduce stronger institutional framework while others do 
not. In search for explanations the theory’s approach is reminiscent of the “cultural 
approach to economics” insofar as its focus extends to areas that are not the primary 
concern of economics (first and foremost issues concerning the society). Therefore this 
work can be regarded as a “missing link” that - implicitly - recognizes the importance 
and relevance of cultural approach at the same time aims to apply it to a very specific 
problem. Two more works could be mentioned here that attempted to achieve this 
concerning the same problem – budget deficits. Krogstrup and Wälti [2009] have 
explicitly looked for connection between deficit levels and cultural attitudes, more 
precisely the difference in preferences for thrift, in certain countries. Similarly, the 
importance of culture in determining fiscal policy is emphasized also by Talpos et al 
[2007].  Compared to these two, the theory chosen here is the most elaborated and most 
advanced. This does not mean however that it is perfect or that it does not deserve 
strong criticism. On the contrary: particularly the forceful suggestions regarding the 
Central and Eastern European countries make it necessary to approach it with 
considerable suspicion. 
 
 
1.3. The theory 
 
The following section is a summary of Gyırffy’s argument taken from Gyırffy 
[2007]. In any other case the source is referred to. The theory has been developed by 
Dóra Gyırffy in frame of a PhD dissertation. Her work examines two questions:  
 
(1) Under what conditions governments implement a stricter budgetary framework 
and limit their discretion over fiscal policy decisions? 
(2) In countries where such rules are implemented why do governments adhere to 
them and forego discretionary spending? 
 
The work includes quantitative as well as qualitative research. The comparative analysis 
of Hungary and Sweden in connection with their fiscal reform attempts provided 
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qualitative results that allowed the development of generalized suggestions. 
Quantitative data on the 12 founding members of the European Monetary Union was 
then used to test the theory. The main focus of Gyırffy’s work was on the old member 
states of the EU (with the exception of Hungary) still there are suggestions also 
concerning the new member states in Central and Eastern Europe. 
The theory has the following major suggestion: a country’s success or failure in setting 
up and sustaining an institutional framework favorable for fiscal restraint depends on 
external and internal factors. If a certain group of countries experiences similar external 
pressure (i.e. globalization in form of market pressure) then obviously domestic factors 
should be examined in order to explain differences in fiscal performance. The theory 
emphasizes two domestic factors that have crucial importance in this regard: 
 
(1) the degree of consensus within the political elite 
(2) the level of public trust in the system 
 
Consequently in face of similar external pressure the difference in the capability of 
countries in establishing fiscal restraint can be mainly explained by the above two 
domestic factors. How the above conclusion was reached will be explained below. 
 
Gyırffy’s theory has an institutionalist approach, which emphasizes the 
importance of institutional arrangements in restricting overspending. Evidence from 
earlier researches is cited to support this notion. Thus it can be established that countries 
with strong fiscal rules have substantially lower budget deficits than those with weak or 
non-existing rules. According to Gyırffy however existing literature fails to explain 
why certain countries implement such restrictive rules while others do not. Moreover it 
is still unclear what factors ensure the sustainability of these rules under subsequent 
governments. As it has been mentioned above these are the two issues Gyırffy’s work 
attempted to answer.   
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1.3.1. External and Domestic factors 
 
Besides focusing on domestic factors the analysis includes external factors as 
well. In order to establish the relevance of domestic factors, first external factors have to 
be examined, that is it has to be made sure that the group of countries in focus 
experience similar external pressure and incentive setting.  Gyırffy mentions two major 
external factor: the pressure from international financial markets to signal commitment 
to good macroeconomic fundamentals and the protective shield against such pressure 
provided by the EMU and the credibility of the common currency. The mechanism 
through which the above factors affect governments and fiscal policy can be summed up 
as following: The liberalization of the capital markets in the 1970s resulted in a jump in 
the amount of available capital for countries to borrow. As a consequence there has 
been a worldwide growth in debt levels and almost inevitably currency crises became 
more frequent. Governments around the world came to the conclusion that signaling 
credibility of economic policies (monetary and fiscal policies) towards the markets is 
crucially important in order to minimize the risks imposed by the volatile nature of 
liberal markets.  
The European Monetary Union is a response to the pressure from the 
international markets. The EMU’s effect on its member states is twofold: on one hand it 
shelters them from external pressure through the credibility of the common currency on 
the other hand its own rules supposed to enforce fiscal restraint. The problem is that the 
latter purpose couldn’t be served effectively due to the weak enforcement mechanisms, 
thus the EMU neutralizes market pressure but does not provide an effective incentive 
for discipline. Currently we can observe substantial variation among EMU member-
states regarding budget deficit levels.  Since the external pressure and incentive setting 
is similar for all of them, these differences can be explained mainly by domestic factors. 
In order to identify these domestic factors the cases of Sweden and Hungary – two 
countries outside the EMU - were compared. The former is an example of successful 
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fiscal consolidation and currently a model country for fiscal restraint, while Hungary is 
an example of failed/ non-sustained reforms. 
Fiscal management reforms or the introduction of rules based fiscal policy 
(which are key drivers of fiscal discipline) do not explicitly hurt any interest groups. 
They do not produce evident winners or losers it is more technical issue. Since such 
rules have no immediate direct consequences on any interest groups (like in the case of 
health care or local government reforms) it is unlikely that these groups would mobilize 
against such reforms. Although it is true that later adhering to these tight rules might 
require taking exactly such unpopular measures. This is where it becomes important 
whether the opposition also respects those rules or it tries to gain popularity by 
condemning them, therefore the realization of fiscal rules is primarily up to the elite’s 
willingness to do so. In the absence of external pressures (e.g. imminent crisis) mainly 
two domestic factors determine whether the political elite is willing to create and 
adhere to fiscal rules that would tie its own hands and limit discretionary fiscal policy: 
 
(1) Elite consensus 
(2) Public trust in the political system 
 
Consensus within the elite is crucial because the government has to be sure that the 
opposition is going to respect those rules that are tying the governments own hands in 
spending. If such consensus does not exist the opposition is likely to exploit the 
situation through populist election promises financed by overspending. Elite consensus 
thus implies that “regardless of which political parties form the government economic 
policy is conducted with a commitment to fiscal restraint” (Gyırffy [2007] p. 183). 
Once such fiscal management reforms are implemented public trust in the political 
system is crucial for sustaining it, since high trust level of the society decreases 
incentives for members of the political elite to deviate from the original consensus. At 
this point it is necessary to take a small detour in order to explain the concept of trust in 
Gyırffy’s work. 
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1.3.2. Trust and Diffuse support 
 
A large part of Gyırffy’s theory is based on David Easton’s system’s theory for 
political analysis. A central element of the theory is the concept of ‘diffuse support’. 
Easton has defined diffuse support as “a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will 
that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effects 
of which they see as damaging to their wants. Outputs and beneficial performance may 
rise and fall while this support, in the form of a generalized attachment, continues.” 
(Easton [1975] p. 444) In other words people have trust in the political system and 
believe that it produces favorable outcomes in the long run even if sometimes the 
immediate outcomes are disadvantageous for them. Gyırffy is using the term “trust” as 
an equivalent of David Easton’s concept of “diffuse support.” As William Mishler and 
Richard Rose have put it “institutional trust is frequently equated with diffuse political 
support”. (Mishler and Rose [2005] p. 1051) Thus in Gyırffy’s use trust means 
institutional trust, which is different from interpersonal trust. (Nevertheless, as it will be 
discussed in later sections, the approach that renders trust and diffuse support equal is 
not necessarily correct and it is not entirely in line with Easton’s concept either.) It is 
easy to see why diffuse support is necessary for the sustainability of fiscal management 
rules. In an environment where diffuse support is low towards the system, where the 
public does not believe that the system brings benefits on the long-run, politicians are 
tempted to buy votes of the electorate through populist promises offering short-term 
benefits for the voters, thus abandoning fiscal restraint.  According to Gyırffy’s theory 
elite consensus and public trust are strengthening each-other in a virtuous circle: 
consensus enables the creation of fiscal management rules that can be sustained due to 
high level of public trust. Sustained fiscal rules produce positive outcomes over a long 
enough period which in turn strengthen trust in the system. Finally continuous trust 
makes it less tempting for the members of the elite to break the consensus and come 
forth with populist promises. 
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1.3.3. Four types of states 
 
Based on the presence or absence of the two domestic factors – elite consensus 
and trust – the theory created four ideal categories of states. It has to be emphasized that 
these are ideal types and they don’t exist in pure form nevertheless most democracies 
can be categorized more or less under one or the other group. The four types are 
presented in a matrix: 
 
DISSENT
Type 1
Democratic ideal
Type 2
Liberal democracy
Type 3
Philosopher's state
Type 4
Mass democracy
CONSENSUS
TRUST
DISTRUST
 
 
The different types are not equally stable. Type 1 is the most stable, but for instance an 
external shock or accumulation of special interest groups can still break the equilibrium 
state. Type 2 and 3 are the least stable and generally they most likely move either to 
type 1 or type 4.  Furthermore the theory suggests that a successful fiscal reform has 
four consecutive stages:  
 
(a) Recognition of fiscal problems 
(b) Fiscal consolidation 
(c) Institutionalized consensus on fiscal restraint 
(d) Institutional sustainability. 
 
Different types of states have different ability to reach these stages Only Type 1 states 
are capable of taking all four steps necessary for a successful fiscal reform, thus Type 1 
states have the highest chance to conduct persistently disciplined fiscal policy. Type 2 
states are likely to take only steps (a) and (b), type 3 countries can reach stage (c), while 
type 4 states are unlikely to proceed further than step (a). According to Gyırffy’s 
argument Sweden – through the successful fiscal adjustment of the early ‘90s – is an 
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example of a state moving from Type 2 to Type 1, while Hungary undoubtedly has the 
attributes of a Type 4 states, where attempts during the past 20 years for fiscal reforms 
have always failed. 
The theory’s general assumptions are based on results from research focusing on 
EMU member states, Sweden and Hungary. The research did not pay particular 
attention to Central and Eastern Europe however it contains a short section where the 
theory is applied to this region (more precisely to the eight new member states from the 
region that joined the EU in 2004). Consequently Gyırffy’s work contains implications 
for the region nevertheless the validity of some of these implications seems at some 
points doubtful. The theory suggests the following regarding Central and Eastern 
Europe: 
In order to test the results of the research Gyırffy compared trust levels of EMU 
member states with their level of budget deficit. Trust was measured as level of 
satisfaction with democracy based on Eurobarometer survey results from 1998-2005. 
After running a linear regression analysis it was found that the level of trust explained 
over 56% of the fiscal deficits. The same analysis was tried on the new member states, 
yet in their case no such connection could be detected. The theory’s explanation for this 
phenomenon is that in contrast with EMU member-states CEE countries face very 
different external incentives: notably the currency boards of the Baltic States have 
disciplining effect on fiscal policy, whereas the Visegrad countries (V4) do not face 
such constraints. 
Another suggestion of the theory is that since level of public trust is substantially 
lower in the CEE countries than in the old member-states, all of them belong to the 
group of Type 3 or 4 countries. Therefore these transition countries are facing serious 
challenges in sustaining fiscal discipline. According to Gyırffy - at the time the research 
was conducted - only the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovenia had good chances to 
become a Type 1 country, as during the few years investigated, these countries showed 
relatively high level and - more importantly - growing tendency of trust. 
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1.3.4. Assessment of the theory 
 
The theory has several advantages. It recognizes that for examination of budget 
deficits an interdisciplinary approach is more suitable than a purely economic approach. 
Moreover it discusses the intensely complex reality through a simple model, which 
enables relatively easy testing. Perhaps most importantly the theory also passed the first 
real-life test. The current Hungarian government has recently been praised for the 
drastic measures in frame of a fiscal adjustment attempt. Indeed budget deficit has been 
reduced below the level of most of Hungary’s regional peers. This however only 
supports the theory, which suggests that in face of external pressure the government is 
willing to take drastic measures in order to avoid disaster, despite the continuously 
existing threat that the opposition takes advantage of it. In Hungary’s case the external 
pressure was a looming bankruptcy in 2008 which is indicated by the fact that Hungary 
was the first country in the region that had to ask for IMF bailout. Sustainability of the 
recent fiscal restraint is however doubted by many experts, which is in line with the 
theory: the two domestic factors are still missing in case of Hungary. 
Despite the above advantages a noticeable shortcoming is that the theory does not seem 
to sufficiently explain variance across CEE countries. This is partly due to the fact that 
the main focus of the research was on the EMU member-states and on the comparison 
of Hungary and Sweden. Some suggestions are offered also regarding the new member-
states however these do not seem to be very convincing, therefore it can be suspected 
that the theory requires some major alterations. This issue will be discussed in details in 
the second part of this paper. 
The above part has been a summary of the framework theory in order to better 
understand its logic and how individual elements connect to each other. Nevertheless in 
the beginning of each chapter a separate section will be devoted to the theory’s 
suggestions regarding the topic of the chapter. 
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1.4. Methodology 
 
 
1.4.1. Structure of the research  
 
The research can be divided into two structural parts. The first part (chapters 2, 3 
and 4) clarifies whether the pre-conditions for the examination of domestic factors are 
met in Central and Eastern Europe. Thus, the second chapter discusses the issue of 
fiscal rules in the countries of the region. The goal of this chapter is to see whether – in 
line with the theory’s suggestion - fiscal rules are crucially important determinants of 
fiscal performance in the region. The third chapter then focuses on external factors. Its 
purpose is to examine the external pressure and incentive setting of the CEE countries 
and to establish that these are similar enough for all countries, so that focus can be 
shifted to domestic factors in search for determinants of different fiscal performance. 
Special attention will be devoted to the issue of currency bard arrangements. Gyırffy 
suggests that the existence of currency board arrangements in several countries create 
substantially different external incentives for these countries thus rendering the effect of 
domestic factors irrelevant. Therefore this issue needs to be clarified in frame of this 
chapter. The first structural unit will use secondary sources: scholarly articles, existing 
calculations, indexes.  
The second structural part (chapter 5 and 6) of the paper discusses domestic 
factors in frame of a comparative analysis wherein the cases of Estonia and Hungary 
will be compared. Here again research is guided by the theory, thus comparison will 
primarily concern the issues of elite consensus and public trust in the system. As it has 
been mentioned, Gyırffy’s work has some brief suggestions for the Central and Eastern 
European countries however serious doubts arouse regarding their validity. Therefore in 
this second structural part one step will be taken back and David Easton’s theory of 
diffuse support will be examined more closely, as it forms an important basis of 
Gyırffy’s theory. The case comparison will be then guided also by Easton’s theory 
besides Gyırffy’s work. Primarily existing literature and at some points survey results 
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will be used as sources for comparison. Based on the results suggestions will be made 
on how to amend or alter Gyırffy’s theory. 
 
 
1.4.2. Estonia and Hungary as optimal cases for comparison 
 
In the comparative analysis the most similar systems design with different 
outcomes (MSDO) approach will be used. That is the analysis aims to explain 
differences in outcomes between similar cases by comparing instances of variation 
among them. This approach is suitable for a research with very few cases. In 
comparative analysis the case selection is a crucially important stage. Besides the clear 
definition of the outcome another consideration “concerns the extent of diversity within 
the selected universe. In this regard, a maximum of heterogeneity over a minimum 
number of cases should be achieved.” (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur [2009] p. 21) For 
the MSDO approach this means that optimal case selection achieves “sufficient 
homogeneity of the universe of cases considered and maximum heterogeneity within 
this universe”. (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur [2009] p. 23) 
Based on these criteria pairing up Estonia with Hungary is ideal for comparative 
analysis. As far as homogeneity of the universe is concerned all 10 Central and Eastern 
European countries share a number of similar characteristics. From a global perspective 
all are located in the same geographical region. All of them have undergone a very 
specific transition period from an authoritarian political and centrally planned economic 
system to democracy and market-economy. As far as the main trends are concerned this 
transition meant economic, political and social development to the same direction, that 
is, all of these countries have aimed to “return” to Europe by becoming full members of 
the EU and NATO and thse organizations have required from candidates essentially the 
same changes in their economic, political and social life. These similarities ensure that 
these countries are ideal candidates for comparison to each other when the research 
concerns the period of transition. It can be said that no other countries in the world share 
these same important characteristics. 
Further important similarities can be observed when focusing only on Estonia 
and Hungary. Both countries have been considered frontrunners in transition (As it has 
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been noted, while Estonia largely managed to retain this position the same can not be 
said about Hungary due to current economic hardships.), moreover their level of 
development – in terms of GDP per capita – is very similar even within the region. 
It is true that for both cases more similar countries could be found from the 
region then however the requirement of maximum heterogeneity would not be met. 
Estonia and Hungary at the same time represent the two extremes as far as the outcome 
– that is budget deficit – is concerned. The chart below demonstrates well this fact. 
 
Average level of budget deficit/surplus* (1995-2009, % of GDP)
Bulgaria
Latvia
Slovenia
Lithuania
HungarySlovakia
Czech Rep.
Poland
Romania
Estonia
-7,00
-6,00
-5,00
-4,00
-3,00
-2,00
-1,00
0,00
1,00
 
  * General government deficit/surplus; Source: Eurostat, World Bank 
 
The case selection is further supported once the table with yearly breakdown is taken 
into consideration. It shows that fiscal performance of Hungary and Estonia has not 
only been on average very different, but this difference has been persistent and steady 
from year to year throughout the entire period. Most other countries in the region have 
had higher volatility in budget deficit levels. For the entire table see Appendix A, below 
the summary of key findings is presented: 
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Bulgaria 18,2 1 7
Czech Rep. 12,6 1 0
Estonia 6,1 0 9
Latvia 10,2 1 0
Lithuania 11,5 1 0
Hungary 6,3 7 0
Poland 5,2 0 0
Romania 7,1 1 0
Slovenia 8,4 0 0
Slovakia 10,4 3 0
No. of years 
with lowest 
deficit
Range of deficit 
(1995-2009, 
% of GDP)
No. of years 
with highest 
deficit
 
  
An important additional characteristic of Estonia is that the extreme fiscal discipline 
does not seem to have stalled economic development. On the contrary, Estonia has been 
constantly ranked in top positions among regional countries in the World Economic 
Forum’s annual Global Competitiveness Report. The repot defines competitiveness on a 
very broad basis, thus includes dimensions such as education, healthcare, state of 
infrastructure, etc. In all of these dimensions Estonia has scored substantially better than 
most of its regional peers including Hungary. Therefore by selecting Estonia as case for 
comparison with Hungary, the mistake of selecting a country that is only performing 
well in the narrow field of the research interest, is avoided. 
 
*** 
 
Before moving on to the case comparison and the examination of domestic 
factors in Estonia and Hungary, the following two chapters will investigate whether 
conditions in Central and Eastern Europe correspond the theory’s suggestions regarding 
the importance of fiscal rules and the similarity of external factors.  
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2. FISCAL RULES 
 
The goal of this chapter is to examine fiscal rules in CEE and to see whether the 
theory’s suggestion regarding the importance of fiscal rules is also valid in the region. 
The first section provides a more detailed summary of the framework theory’s 
suggestion on this issue. 
 
 
2.1. The theory’s suggestions regarding fiscal rules 
 
A major conclusion of the theory is that fiscal institutions are crucially important 
determinants of fiscal performance. Gyırffy’s theory asserts that specifically the 
existence of rules-based fiscal policy (as opposed to discretionary fiscal policy) is the 
relevant factor. This is mainly based on the results of the research conducted by Marc 
Hallerberg and Jürgen von Hagen. In their article they contested the widespread view 
among institutionalists that electoral systems strongly influence fiscal deficit. Nouriel 
Roubini and Jeffrey Sachs for instance argue in their often cited paper that proportional 
electoral systems are more deficit prone than plurality systems, as the previous tends to 
generate coalition governments where negotiations between coalition partners creates 
bigger pressure for inflated budget than under a one party government in a plurality 
electoral system. (Roubini and Sachs [1988]) 
Hallerberg and von Hagen examined the fiscal performance of the 15 old 
member states of the European Union in the period between 1981 and 1994. According 
to the results merely the type of electoral system does not determine fiscal outcomes as 
countries under both systems can achieve low deficits if they choose the right 
institutional setting. In a plurality system - where the government is usually formed by 
one party - delegating authority to a finance minister who oversees the spending of 
other ministers proves to be a feasible solution.  Multi-party governments in turn can 
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achieve lower deficit through a system of fiscal contracts wherein the ministries (and 
other spending bodies) of the government agree on a fiscal target in the very beginning 
of the budgeting process, which implicitly puts a limit to all ministries bargaining power 
for larger spending ceilings. Empirical evidence supported the theory: those countries 
that had either one of the systems in place (matching their electoral system) exhibited 
substantially lower deficits during the above period than those without, regardless of 
electoral system. (Hallerberg and von Hagen [1997]) 
The work by Perotti et al. – also cited by Gyırffy – focuses on the importance of 
fiscal institutions for sustainable fiscal policy in the old member states of the EU. 
Similarly to Hallerberg and von Hagen, they find correlation between strong institutions 
and low deficits, however here the difference between countries regarding fiscal 
institutions is gradual: countries are ranked according to the strength of their fiscal 
institutions and this rank then shows correlation with budget deficit levels. (Perotti et al 
[1998])3 
Gyırffy’s work then goes on to explain why fiscal rules are important and how 
exactly they contribute to the reduction of deficits. Referring to Per Molander she 
identifies five major rationality-related problems with budgeting: aggregation problems, 
prisoner’s dilemma situations, long time horizons, uncertainty and ignorance, principal-
agent situations. In the following a brief overview is given on how different types of 
fiscal institutions can tackle the above problems.  
When a budget consists of thousands of line items the outcome depends very 
much on the aggregation method, thus reduction in the dimension of the budget or 
implementation of the agenda setter’s preference are ways to overcome challenges of 
this type. The prisoner dilemma in budgeting refers to the situation where the ministries 
ask for extra spending limits without having to bear the full social costs of the inflated 
budget, thus of a larger deficit. To overcome this problem, fiscal institutions should 
enhance cooperation among ministries. There is strong incentive for most actors within 
a budgeting process to live up future resources through increased spending on the short 
run. Sustainability requires institutions that extend time horizons by setting medium-
term targets. Uncertainty / ignorance and the principal agent situation problems refer to 
the relation between the voters and representatives and the problems arising from 
                                                 
3
 Gyırffy [2007] quotes the results 
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asymmetric information. Thus, transparency becomes an important feature of fiscal 
institutions. (Molander [2001])4  
 
 
2.2. Fiscal rules in Central and Eastern Europe 
 
Now that the theory’s suggestions regarding fiscal rules have been clarified, the purpose 
of this chapter is to examine fiscal rules in the CEE region. If the theory’s suggestions 
can be applied also to this region then - just like in the case of old EU members - 
connection between quality of fiscal rules and level of budget deficit should be 
observable in these countries.  
First and foremost however fiscal rules should be defined: what exactly are fiscal rules 
for the purpose of this paper? 
 
 
2.2.1. Conceptualization of fiscal rules 
 
The recognized researcher of fiscal institutions, George Kopits gives the following 
definition for fiscal policy rules:  “A fiscal policy rule is […] [a] permanent constraint 
on fiscal policy, typically defined in terms of an indicator of overall fiscal performance. 
The rules under consideration cover summary fiscal indicators, such as the government 
budget deficit, borrowing, debt, or major components thereof – often expressed as a 
numerical ceiling or target, in proportion to gross domestic product (GDP).” (Kopits 
and Symansky [1998] p. 2.) He thus provides a definition which is rather limited in 
scope, wherein only simple numerical rules, such as an overall balanced budget rule or 
limits on borrowing can be regarded as fiscal rules. When considering the above 
described five rationality-related problems of budgeting, numerical rules only answer 
the problems of aggregation and time horizon, however are less effective in tackling the 
issues connected to transparency and the prisoner dilemma. Transparency is challenged 
through the inherent incentive of numerical rules for creative accounting. The prisoner 
dilemma remains unsolved since merely an overall limit to the entire budget – though 
                                                 
4
 Quoted by Gyırffy [2007] 
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increases the bargaining power of high level decision makers - provides very little 
incentive to ministries and bureaucrats to limit their requests for extra spending. 
(Gyırffy [2007] p. 55-58) If we adhere to the above definition of fiscal rules and 
consider only simple numerical rules than little differentiation is possible among the 
countries of the CEE region. Only Poland and Estonia has in place such rule. The 
constitution of Poland provides that the government debt can not exceed 60% of the 
GDP. (Constitution of the Republic of Poland, Article 215.) In Estonia the State Budget 
Law of 1999 regulates budget deficit: in case expenditure exceeds receipts the budget 
has to be balanced through lending and by using a special reserve fund.5  
Gyırffy’s theory defines fiscal rules in broader terms. Besides numerical rules 
she considers independent fiscal councils and more importantly procedural rules as 
possible elements of such fiscal policy.  Fiscal councils need to be independent from the 
government as the main purpose for such a body is to guard macroeconomic stability by 
preventing unsustainable and deficit prone fiscal policy of the government which is 
allocating the funds. While fiscal councils can solve the time horizon problem their 
major disadvantage is the lack of tools to influence fiscal policy. In a democracy the 
elected government by definition is responsible for the allocation and distribution of 
funds. Independent central banks have tools like interest rates, open market operations, 
etc. to influence monetary policy similar means are not available for fiscal councils. 
Therefore their role is confined to advising the government. This is not to say that 
independent fiscal councils can have no impact on fiscal policy. If they are reputable 
and widely accepted by the political forces then their say on fiscal issues definitely have 
weight. Since 2008 and independent fiscal council operates in Hungary.6   
The most complex set of fiscal rules is the group of procedural rules or 
budgeting rules. All those rules that coordinate the procedure of budget creation are 
included. For the purpose of this research this group is the most important for two 
reasons: (1) procedural rules include numerical rules and fiscal councils at different 
stages of budget preparation, thus procedural rules represent the widest set of fiscal 
                                                 
5
  There is no unilateral consensus whether the provisions of the above law are sufficient to consider 
Estonia a country with an explicit balanced budget rule in place. See for instance: Kraan et al [2008] p. 
10. or see Andrus Säälik’s presentation, downloadable at: 
www.jvi.org/fileadmin/jvi_files/DG.../Andrus_Saalik_presentation.pdf 
6
 Homepage of the Fiscal Council of Hungary http://www.mkkt.hu/en/ 
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rules. (2) Examining procedural rules allows us to differentiate countries more 
delicately and rank them more precisely according to the quality of their fiscal rules. 
Adequate procedural rules address the challenges stemming from the prisoner’s 
dilemma situations or as it is often called the common pool resource situation. “As 
financing is shared by all tax payers, while benefits from spending can be targeted, 
individual policy makers consider the full benefits from expanding projects in their 
districts or relevant policy areas, but take into account only that share of the social 
marginal costs of higher taxes or borrowing that is borne by their constituents. The 
incomplete internalization of the social costs of expenditures leads policy makers to 
demand an overspending on and/or excessive debt financing of their preferred projects 
compared to the social optimal level that equates social marginal costs and benefits.” 
(Gleich [2003] p. 8) Therefore an optimal procedural rule setting creates incentives for 
the bureaucrats to internalize the costs of government spending. Besides the common 
pool resource situations, these rules also concern the aggregation problem (for instance 
through strengthening the agenda setter role of the finance minister) and might increase 
time horizon, by creating multi-annual targets.  
Budgeting rules are usually examined according to the different stages of budget 
creation: preparation or planning, legislation or authorization, and implementation. 
During preparation the main issue is how to limit spending requests of the different 
ministries and spending bodies. This can happen for instance through setting overall 
targets or strengthening the position of the finance minister vis-à-vis other ministers. 
When the draft budget is in the parliament for consideration procedural rules should 
limit the legislation’s ability to increase the total expenditure. Finally during 
implementation it has to be made sure that the budget is adapted according to the plan 
and only justified amendments are made to the original version.  
The diagram below provides an overview of fiscal rules thus it gives a graphical 
summary of the content of this subsection:  
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2.2.2. Budgeting rules in Central and Eastern Europe 
 
The current section examines budgeting rules in CEE then tests the connection between 
the quality of rules and fiscal performance in these countries. A number of researches 
have been completed on the procedural rules of the CEE countries. The three works that 
will be considered here were chosen because all of them quantify their results as index 
values, making thus comparison of countries easier according to quality of their 
budgeting rules. Moreover they provide data about budgeting rules in different times. 
Since the scores and values reflect the state of budgeting rules only at a given point in 
time and since stark changes are possible in budgeting rules from year to year (as it is 
suggested by the literature) it is important that data is examined from multiple years, 
thus having more reliable information on the quality of budgeting rules in each country.  
The first index was created by Holger Gleich. He examined the quality of 
budgeting rules in 10 countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. In order to rank these countries he 
created an index, which is compiled of 13 dimensions divided among the three stages of 
budgeting with each dimension comprising of two to five institutional characteristics. 
Procedural / Budgeting rules 
 
Planning / 
Preparation 
Legislation / 
Authorization 
Implementation 
Simple 
numerical rules 
Complex 
numerical rules 
Independent 
fiscal councils 
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More details about the structure of Gleich’s index can be found in Appendix A. The 
index reflects the state of budgeting rules in 1997 while it also includes amended values 
that reflect changes that occurred in 1998, 1999 and 2001. When testing the results 
Gleich compared only the index values of 1997 with average budget deficit levels of the 
respective countries in 1994-1998. The results have shown strong connection between 
quality of budgeting rules and deficit levels. (Gleich [2003]) Therefore also in this paper 
only the values of 1997 will be considered from this index. 
 
 
        Source: Gleich [2003] 
 
Gleich’s index only covers a part of the period in the focus of the current research, 
therefore more recent data is required additionally to have more reliable picture of the 
budgeting institutions during the past roughly two decades. The second index that will 
be considered here has been compiled by Stefania Fabrizio and Ashoka Mody. The 
logic and structure of Gleich’s index is largely followed by them. The only difference in 
the structure is that instead of Gleich’s 13 dimensions Fabrizio and Mody use only 12, 
leaving out the issue of power relation between the parliament’s upper and lower house. 
(For details see Appendix B) This second index shows the quality of budgeting rules in 
2003 in the same 10 countries. Since the structure of the two indexes is very similar 
they are largely compatible with each other. In order to make them comparable one 
minor technical change needs to b applied: in Gleich’s index the total index score is a 
sum of subtotals for preparation, legislation and implementation stages, while in the 
Fabrizion and Mody’s index the total is calculated by taking the average score received 
for the three stages. For the sake of comparability, in this paper the total scores of the 
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second index are calculated according to the logic of Gleich’s index, that is they are the 
sum and not the average of subtotals. It has to be noted that this amendment to the 
second index does not distort the information as both methods assign equal weights to 
the individual budgeting stages. 
When testing their index values Fabrizio and Mody, similarly to Gleich, have 
found strong connection between budgeting rules and average deficit levels: “For a 
measure of the quality of fiscal institutions, intended to capture checks and balances 
through hierarchical rules and collegiality, we find that a higher quality of institutions 
has a material bearing on the budgetary discipline.” (Fabrizio and Mody [2006] p. 25) 
 
 
        Source: Fabrizio and Mody [2006] 
 
The third index considered here has been compiled by Mark Hallerberg and Sami 
Yläoutinen. This index provides quantified data on the quality of budgeting rules in 
2007. This third index is less compatible with the previous two indexes, nevertheless it 
is still possible to consider it for this research. This third work follows the structure of 
the research conducted by Hallerberg and von Hagen [1997]. This earlier research forms 
the basis of Gyırffy’s argument about the importance of fiscal institutions as it was 
referred to earlier (see section 2.1.). Thus the third index is the application of 
Hallerberg’s and von Hagen’s earlier findings on the CEE region. Similarly to the 
previous two indexes Hallerberg and Yläoutinen examine the different stages of budget 
creation as well but along different dimensions than Gleich or Fabrizio and Mody did. 
Therefore their findings are less compatible with the previous two indexes. More 
importantly –as it has been discussed earlier in chapter 2.1. – this model distinguishes 
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between plurality and proportional electoral systems, arguing that both systems have an 
optimal budgeting rule setting which are different from each other: the former (mostly 
one party governments) should increase the power of the finance minister, whereas in 
the latter system (mostly coalition governments) fiscal contracts negotiated before the 
budgeting process can increase fiscal discipline. Therefore two separate indexes were 
created that assess budgeting institutions according to the requirements of proportional 
and plurality electoral systems, named “contract” and “delegation” indexes respectively. 
(For details see Appendix B) Both indexes assess the 10 countries according to the state 
of institutions in 1998, 2003 and 2007. (Hallerberg and Yläoutinen [2008]) Nevertheless 
since data for 1997 and 2003 are already provided by the previous two indexes, from 
the third index only the values of 2007 will be considered in this paper. 
 
 
            Source: Hallerberg and Yläoutinen [2008] 
 
In order to assess the strength of a country’s budget rules one is advised to consider the 
index value that corresponds the country’s electoral system. All CEE countries have 
some form of proportional system in place. In case of Hungary however it is more 
appropriate to consider the “delegation” index, due to the peculiarity of the party 
system, where in the past one of the two major parties has been in power with a 
significantly smaller coalition partner. This situation thus qualifies Hungarian politics to 
be regarded a one party government system. (Hallerberg and Yläoutinen [2008] p. 11) 
For all other CEE countries the “contract” index is relevant. Unfortunately the 
“contract” index differentiates less among the countries, since it is comprised of only 
one sub-index: the “long-term planning constraint” index which consists of only four 
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components (the issues of multi-annual targets, the degree of commitment to them, 
length of time-horizon and the nature of budget forecasts). All other examined 
dimensions can only be used for constructing the “delegation index”. The appropriate 
index for CEE countries – according to Hallerberg and Yläoutinen - thus consists of the 
“delegation” value for Hungary and the “contract” values for all other countries. 
 
 
2.2.3. Creating and testing the aggregate index 
 
As it has been mentioned the main goal of this chapter is to establish that the quality of 
fiscal rules is a crucially important determinant of fiscal performance also in CEE. So 
far in this sub-section three indexes were examined, each of them providing data on the 
quality of budgeting rules in 10 CEE countries in three different times: 1997, 2003 and 
2007. In case of all three indexes it has been established (by the scholars who compiled 
them) that budgeting rules have determined budget deficit levels in the respective 
observed period. It thus seems that sufficient evidence supports the notion about the 
significance of fiscal rules.  
Nevertheless the construction of an aggregate index is still useful. This aggregate 
reflects the average quality of budgeting rules using the values of the three above 
indexes. Therefore the aggregate provides an approximate picture about the state of 
budgeting rules during a longer period. Thus it is possible to compare the aggregate 
scores to the average deficit levels of 1995-2009. This test can be regarded on one hand 
as double checking the results of authors who constructed the above indexes. On the 
other hand aggregate index creation and testing is necessary to see whether significance 
of budgeting rules stays valid also when observing the entire period (not just periods of 
few years), that is the period from the beginning of transition up until now. In the 
following the issues concerning the creation of the aggregate index will be discussed. 
The aggregate index consists of the total values from 1997, 2003 and the values 
of the combined “delegation”/”contract” index from 2007. Since the indexes of 1997 
and 2003 are highly compatible with each other the real issue is whether the data from 
2007 can be included without significantly distorting the overall picture. First the values 
from the three indexes should have the same order of magnitude. This can be achieved 
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by simply multiplying the values in the 1997 and 2003 indexes by 10. The range of 
values is quite similar in the three indexes except for the fact that the 2007 index 
“punishes” Hungary with a much lower score relative to the other countries than either 
one of the 1997 and 2003 indexes did. Secondly it needs to be checked whether the 
2007 index ranks countries similarly to the previous two indexes?  
 
Quality of fiscal rules
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* The values for 2007 are from “contract” index except for Hungary where it is from “delegation” 
index 
Source: Fabrizio and Mody [2006]; Gleich [2003]; Hallerberg and Yläoutinen [2008] 
 
As it can be seen also in the 2007 index previous high performers notably Slovenia and 
Estonia continue receiving the highest scores while Hungary continues to be at the 
lower end. 
If the rankings were very different it had to be suspected that the 2007 index is not 
compatible with the other two indexes. Of course it could be argued that similar ranking 
merely does not suffice for declaring compatibility as it could very well be the case that 
rules in certain countries have changed by 2007, which would change overall sores, 
while the precise magnitude of these changes could only be assessed through a research 
that follows the structure of the 1997 and 2003 indexes. Indeed the degree of 
compatibility of the 2007 index is arguable, nevertheless in my opinion it can still be 
used for creating an aggregate index for several reasons: (1) the aggregate index intends 
to capture major tendencies to see whether fiscal rules substantially influence fiscal 
performance in the region. (2) All authors have examined procedural rules even if in 
different structure, thus the results can not be widely different. (3) This is also reflected 
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by the above noted fact that the 2007 index does not change country ranking 
significantly. 
The aggregate index is created as an average of the values in the three indexes, 
which is then tested - using linear regression analysis - on average budget deficit levels 
between 1995 and 2009: 
 
 
*In the period: 1995-2009; Source: Eurostat, World Bank 
 
The results of the regression analysis can be found below: 
 
Bulgaria 56,7 -1,03%
Czech Rep. 62,7 -4,69%
Estonia 82,4 0,29%
Hungary 41,5 -6,11%
Latvia 70,3 -1,92%
Lithuania 62,9 -3,22%
Poland 66,4 -4,40%
Romania 56,6 -3,36%
Slovakia 57,7 -5,45%
Slovenia 78,6 -2,82%
Aggregate index
(independent var.)
Average deficit (1995-2009) 
(dependent var.)
 
 
Results for CEE-8 (excluding Romania and Bulgaria): 
 
Y = Average level of deficit; X = Aggregate index of fiscal rules 
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Y = 0.141 X – 12.771 
Sig. = 0.006 
N = 8;    R2 = 0.748 
 
 
Results for all 10 countries: 
 
Y = 0.113X – 10.454 
Sig. = 0.035 
N = 10;   R2 = 0.446 
 
 
Results for CEE-9 (without Bulgaria): 
 
Y = 0.132X – 12.034 
Sig. = 0.005 
N = 9;   R2 = 0.694 
 
As it could be expected there is strong positive connection between the quality of fiscal 
rules and the degree of fiscal discipline in case of the eight CEE countries (quality of 
budgeting rules explains 75% of the variation fiscal deficits). The connection is still 
significant if Romania is included (budgeting rules explain 69% of variation in fiscal 
performance), however the inclusion of Bulgaria weakens the result substantially (R-
square=0.446). It is worth noting that Bulgaria has showed considerable fiscal discipline 
since the introduction of a currency board arrangement in 1997. Its budgeting rules 
however remained weak, hence the weaker connection between budgeting rules and 
deficit levels if Bulgaria is included in the sample. Based on this it could be suspected 
that currency boards substantially influence fiscal performance. It will be discussed in 
the next chapter whether this is true and how the existence of currency boards in CEE 
countries influence the applicability of Gyırffy’s model to the region. 
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It can be concluded that similarly to the case of old EMU member states, fiscal 
rules have a decisive role in fiscal performance also in the eight CEE countries, which 
are in the focus of my research. 
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3. EXTERNAL FACTORS 
 
In this chapter it will be examined whether the CEE region fulfills the theory’s criteria 
regarding similar external pressure/incentive setting. 
 
 
3.1. The theory’s suggestions regarding external factors 
 
The theory’s assumption is that external factors have some disciplining effect on the 
individual countries’ fiscal policy, nevertheless this effect is limited. In a nutshell, the 
theory implies that after abandoning the Bretton Woods system and the liberalization of 
the global financial markets in the early ‘70s governments around the world step by step 
learned (as a result of some crisis) that demonstrating credibility, exhibiting sound 
macro economic fundamentals is crucially important to reduce a country’s vulnerability 
to financial volatility. Sustainable fiscal position is a key element of those 
fundamentals. (Gyırffy [2007] p. 78-87.) Once the credibility suffers the market forces 
punish the country mainly through increasing interest rates on external borrowing and if 
the country is unable to restore credibility the downward spiral culminates in 
bankruptcy.  
Another assumption regarding external factors is that they enhance policy 
transfer among countries. Since governments are aware of the importance of credibility 
they are looking for best practices from around the world, in this process international 
organizations like the IMF play an important role. In the field of monetary policy such 
widely accepted policy “best practice” has been the independence of central banks, 
while - according to Gyırffy - in recent years fiscal rules are receiving more and more 
attention. 
Before 1993 the prospective EMU member states were exhibiting rather large 
budget deficits (Gyırffy [2007] p. 189). The situation however changed radically in the 
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years preceding the creation of the Eurozone: all prospective members underwent 
substantial fiscal adjustment in order to meet the Maastricht criteria necessary to join 
the monetary union. In this case external pressure – namely fear of missing the first 
group of states crating the monetary union - created substantial consensus in these 
countries about the importance of fiscal restraint. Once inside the Eurozone however the 
member states’ fiscal performance varied strongly. The theory has the following 
explanation for this phenomenon: while on paper the EMU imposes very specific fiscal 
constraint on its member states (the well known 3% of the GDP threshold for budget 
deficit) the enforcement mechanisms are very weak. Thus the EMU membership’s 
disciplining effect is much weaker than that of the market forces at the same time the 
monetary union provides a credibility shield for its members against market forces, 
therefore in case of the member states external pressure is neutralized. 
Some members nevertheless continue to display considerable fiscal restrain. In a 
number of countries the EMU “did induce a lasting move towards discipline [and] it 
proved to be a useful anchor in countries, which have started fiscal adjustment.” 
(Gyırffy [2007] p. 110). These countries have domestically imposed fiscal rules and 
this fact reflects the essential importance of domestic factors.  
Further evidence for the limited effect of external factors and the importance of 
domestic factors is brought about through the comparative analysis of Hungary and 
Sweden. None of them are members of the EMU, thus both face external market forces 
without enjoying the protective shield of credibility provided by the Euro and both have 
faced crises (Sweden in the early ‘90s, Hungary in 1994/95). While the disciplining 
effect of the crisises induced fiscal adjustment in both countries only Sweden managed 
to use this momentum and create a system of sustainable fiscal discipline, while 
Hungary – after the immediate threat of the crises faded – returned to lax fiscal policy. 
The explanation of this difference – once again – lies in domestic factors. 
 
 
3.2. External pressure in CEE 
 
First, it has to be examined whether similar tendencies regarding external 
pressure/incentives can be detected in CEE. Here mainly two issues need to be 
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addressed: (1) did the pre-accession period, the period of preparation for EU 
membership, mean similar external disciplining effect for the CEE countries as did the 
preparation for EMU membership for current EMU members? (2) Does EU 
membership provide protection from market forces for the CEE countries? The short 
answer for both questions is: “no” or “very modest” at best 
Soon after the regime changes in 1989/91 all of the eight CEE countries have declared 
their intention to join the EU. The accession procedure meant close monitoring by 
Brussels on the progress of meeting the membership criteria. Theoretically this could 
have evoked a strong incentive for fiscal discipline in a similar way the EMU 
membership preparation affected the performance of its 12 prospective members. 
However during the accession period the EU’s main concern was to ensure that crucial 
structural reforms are taking place even if this means (temporarily) higher budget deficit 
for these countries. (Berger et al [2004] p. 10-11) In the words of the Commission: 
“CEECs are not required to fulfill the Maastricht nominal convergence criteria, but 
rather to comply with the Copenhagen criteria. The primary fiscal concern in the pre-
accession period is medium-term budgetary sustainability, rather than achieving any 
particular target for the government balance. […] Setting of specific budgetary targets 
could be misleading and the priority should remain on improving the functioning of the 
budgeting process, carrying out structural reforms, implementing the acquis 
communautaire, and supporting catching up.” (Commission [2002]) Not insisting on 
sound macro economic performance as a criterion for membership, Brussels could not 
effectively impose fiscal discipline on the accession countries.  
By becoming members of the EU these countries agreed to eventually join the 
monetary union as well. However the lack of a clear, binding deadline for EMU 
accession combined with weak enforcement mechanisms of the EU against members 
that are persistently breaching the 3% budget deficit level deprived the system of any 
disciplining effect. Berger-Kopits-Székely [2004] offers a game theoretic model to 
explain differences in fiscal performance among countries of region, wherein fiscal 
behavior of these countries influences each other’s conduct of fiscal policy. In line with 
the model it can be argued that as more and more new member states are adopting the 
Euro the incentive will gradually increase for the remaining new-members to meet the 
criteria avoiding the obvious embarrassment of being the last country to join. At the 
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same time recent developments somewhat amended the overall picture and it is now 
questionable whether EMU membership is still unequivocally attractive option for new 
EU members. The not in every aspect positive experiences of Slovenia and particularly 
Slovakia with the Euro moreover the fundamental problems of the Euro-area becoming 
very visible due to the Greek crisis increased voices in CEE that question whether it is 
still in the best interest of these countries to adopt the Euro as soon as possible. 
  Regarding the protective effect of EU membership: since EU membership – at 
least theoretically – also means eventual Euro adoption (which – again theoretically – 
requires sound macroeconomic fundamentals), EU members might enjoy slightly higher 
market confidence than non-member states. This was reflected in decreasing long-term 
interest rates of new members, also in cases (i.e. the Visegrad countries) where this was 
not justified by fiscal performance. (Gyırffy [2007] p. 102) Nevertheless mere EU 
membership does not provide as strong protection against market forces as EMU 
membership. 
Moreover it has to be noted that the above external factors affected all eight 
countries in the region to a similar degree: all of them have existed in the same 
international environment equally exposed to market forces, all of them had the strong 
intention to join the EU (which they did at the same time) and officially all of them aim 
to introduce the Euro as soon as possible, thus the observable large differences in their 
fiscal performance can be ascribed to differences in domestic factors. 
Gyırffy’s work however has one important statement regarding external 
incentives / constraints in the CEE region.  Evidence from the EMU countries seems to 
support the theory’s assumption, about the importance of domestic factors namely that 
the degree of public support is an important domestic factor in determining a country’s 
fiscal discipline. In case of EMU member states Gyırffy has found strong correlation 
between the level of satisfaction with democracy and a country’s budget deficit level. 
The same test however fails to give supportive results in the CEE region: Unlike in the 
case of EMU member states, for the eight new EU members no correlation could be 
detected between the level of public trust and the level of budget deficit. Gyırffy gave 
the following explanation for this phenomenon: 
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“Unlike EMU member states, which face similar external incentives with regard to 
fiscal policies, the new member states have rather different constraints. In the Baltic 
States the widely known dangers of pursuing profligate policies with a currency board 
arrangement ensure the maintenance of consensus over different governments. At the 
same time the Visegrad countries do not face such constraints […]” (Gyırffy [2007] p. 
196) 
 
The above statement is crucially important from the perspective of my research 
therefore it has to be carefully examined. The statement has two elements:  
 
(1) A currency board creates substantial external incentives for fiscal discipline 
(2) This external incentive overrides the effect and importance of domestic factors 
(hence the impossibility to recognize similar correlation concerning public trust 
and fiscal deficits as in the case of EMU countries) 
 
Before discussing these two points in detail, it is necessary to see what a currency board 
arrangement (CBA) is and how it affects fiscal policy. 
 
 
3.3. Currency board arrangements 
 
The currency board is an exchange rate arrangement which has three major elements 
(Pikkani [2000] p. 5): 
 
(1) Fixed exchange rate of the domestic currency to an anchor currency 
(2) Free convertibility of the domestic currency at this fixed exchange rate 
(3) Full backing of the emitted domestic currency by foreign reserves 
 
These are the elements of an ideal CBA however there might be certain deviations from 
it. In fact CBA does not exist anywhere in its pure form. The example with the smallest 
deviation in Europe is the Estonian CBA. (Grigonyté [2003] p. 119) 
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The anchor currency can also be a currency basket (this was initially the case in 
Lithuania). Regarding the issue of full backing it needs to be clarified what has to be 
backed, how broad interpretation of domestic currency the legislation uses: emitted 
notes and coins, the liabilities of the central bank, or even broader interpretation? What 
can be considered as an instrument to back the domestic currency might also vary from 
case to case: In Argentina for instance initially only 66.6% of the monetary liabilities of 
the central bank had to be held in foreign reserves, the rest could be held in Argentinean 
bonds denominated in foreign currency (Hanke-Schuler [2002] p.44). An interesting 
case is Estonia, where – to overcome initial shortage of reserves – the Supreme Council 
150 million dollars worth of state forests to the Bank of Estonia reserves. (Kallas [1994] 
p. 9) 
The CBA first and foremost is a very tight monetary regime whereby the country 
abstains from conducting an independent monetary policy. The aim is to achieve 
confidence in the currency thus fighting inflation. Sustaining credibility however 
requires sound macroeconomic policies thus - besides monetary policy - the CBA has 
strong implications for fiscal policy as well. Persistent fiscal deficit leads to increasing 
debt, which reduces reserves. Eventually this can lead to the collapse of the currency 
peg. (Camilleri Gilson [2002] p. 16-17; Grigonyté [2003] p. 113-114) 
 
 
3.3.1. Currency boards as incentives for persistent consensus 
 
According to the first claim of Gyırffy’s statement currency boards are external 
incentives, which might seem rather surprising given the fact that a CBA is consciously 
chosen by countries and not externally imposed upon them. Gyırffy’s work mentions 
two types of external incentives / pressures: (a) a looming or already existing crisis 
following the shaking trust of markets in the countries macroeconomic fundamentals 
creates a positive incentive towards fiscal discipline – at least temporarily; whereas (b) a 
monetary union (e.g. the EMU) where the credibility of common currency creates a 
protective shield from market pressure which is an obvious disincentive for fiscal 
discipline. 
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Although Gyırffy doesn’t mention explicitly, it seems that – according to this 
first part of her statement – currency boards should be some sort of mixture of the above 
two: they signal credibility – like the EMU- yet have a positive effect on fiscal 
discipline – like crisis threats and unlike the EMU.  However while in the EMU there 
are many “free rider” states which enjoy the benefits of the credibility of the common 
currency but themselves are not contributing to its stability with their lax fiscal policy, 
in case of CBA both the advantages of credibility and the price for maintaining it are 
100 percently incumbent on one country. In this sense CBAs rather resemble fiscal 
rules, whereby the government ties its own hands at the same time the existence of the 
rules signals credibility.  
As it was discussed in the introduction, the third stage of implementing a 
successful fiscal reform is institutionalized consensus on fiscal restraint that is the 
creation of rules for disciplined fiscal policy. The fourth stage in turn is sustaining these 
rules, which requires – according to the theory – public support for the system, since 
only high public support can eliminate incentives to deviate from the consensus.  
The second element of Gyırffy’s statement implies that the effects of CBA on 
fiscal policy create favorable conditions for both third and fourth stages. How exactly 
can this happen? CBA has a disciplining effect similar to market forces since if unsound 
macroeconomic policies fail to sustain the system the eventual outcome will be currency 
devaluation just like in the case of financial crisises under different currency regimes, 
e.g. free floating. The main difference and the additional feature of a CBA is that cause 
and effect relationship is much more transparent and visible also to the public. Under a 
CBA persistently unsound fiscal policies lead either to default on debt and/or to the 
abandonment of the currency peg, which means devaluation of a previously stable 
currency. Currency devaluation is a phenomena which makes the otherwise complicated 
macroeconomic developments very much understandable for the wider public, as it 
effects them immediately and directly. The CBA reduces “the incentive to inflate, 
because the devaluation costs attach an extra penalty to inflation, and this disincentive 
scheme is public knowledge. Thus a credible commitment to a highly visible target such 
as the exchange rate provides an effective way to strengthen domestic financial 
discipline and eliminate an inflation bias.” (Grigonyté [2003] p. 113) 
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The second element of Gyırffy’s statement implies that the political costs of a 
possible abandonment of the fixed exchange rate (which most likely implies 
devaluation) in the future are so high that merely the fear from it is sufficient to sustain 
elite consensus regarding the importance of fiscal discipline. Thus in countries where a 
CBA is in place the level of public support is irrelevant regarding fiscal outcomes. 
Logically this also means that would currency board arrangements not exist in any 
country of the region one could observe in CEE similar correlation between level of 
public trust and budget deficits like in the EMU.  
Some evidence – at least from the region – seems to support the crucial 
importance of CBAs in fiscal outcomes. Dalia Grigonyté examined the fiscal 
performance of 10 CEE countries between 1994 and 2001. In the region Estonia, 
Lithuania and Bulgaria has a CBA in place. She has found that the CBA has significant 
negative effect on budget deficit (that is CBAs increase fiscal discipline) and this holds 
even if the quality of budgeting institutions are controlled for (she used Holger Gleich’s 
data on budgeting institutions). (Grigonyté [2003]) It has to be noted here that once we 
take into consideration also the period after 2001 the evidence is even more supportive. 
This is mainly due to the fact that the period examined by Grigonyté included the 
Russian crisis which hit the Baltic countries particularly strong, resulting in temporarily 
higher deficits in the three countries out of which two has a CBA in place, decreasing 
thus the overall performance of countries with CBA. When comparing CBAs and 
simple pegs other authors (Fatas-Rose [2001]; Alberola-Molina [2000]; Grimm [2007]) 
also found that the former induces fiscal discipline while the latter rather has negative 
effect on it.  
However not everyone shares this view. Guillermo Calvo and Frederic Mishkin 
focused on “hard peg” systems (i.e. CBA and dollarization) and came to the conclusion 
that “the key to macroeconomic success in emerging market countries is not primarily 
their choice of exchange rate regime, but rather the health of the countries fundamental 
macroeconomic institutions, including the institutions associated with fiscal stability 
[…]”. (Calvo-Mishkin [2003] p. 115) Similar conclusion has been drawn by Adalbert 
Knöbl, Andres Sutt and Basil Zavoico, when assessing CBA’s role in Estonia’s 
economic transition. They found that “the CBA in Estonia […] was more symptomatic 
of a broader intellectual and political commitment to the rapid transition to a market 
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economy and prudent and transparent macroeconomic policies than it was a cause of the 
very apparent success of the Estonian economy.” (Knöbl et al [2002] p. 21) Furthermore 
the above mentioned notion that CBAs are superior to conventional pegs concerning 
fiscal discipline is also doubtful if we take a look at the evidence. The only country with 
a conventional fixed exchange rate regime in the region is Latvia. Although 
theoretically Latvia should have substantially larger deficits than its two Baltic 
neighbors with a CBA, in fact it has shown more fiscal restraint than Lithuania. The 
case of Argentina demonstrates that it is unjustified to assume automatic fiscal 
discipline even under a CBA. Moreover it has to be noted that – somewhat 
contradictory to her previous statement – even Gyırffy acknowledges the limitations to 
the unconditional disciplining effect of currency boards and refers to Berger et al 
[2004], who state that differences in fiscal performance of the eight CEE countries can 
not be explained by the different exchange rate regimes. (Berger et al [2004] p. 6)  
In light of the above discussion it can be stated it is at least ambiguous whether a 
CBA substantially induces fiscal discipline and if it does to what extent. Furthermore 
assuming that a CBA has automatic disciplining effect on fiscal policy regardless of 
other factors seems to be far fetched. Therefore Gyırffy’s suggestion that the existence 
of CBAs in CEE overrides the importance of domestic factors has rather weak 
fundamentals. 
To prove the invalidity of her hypothesis we can test it using the original data 
presented by Gyırffy, yet excluding the cases of Estonia and Lithuania, the two 
countries with a CBA in place. If the correlation between public trust and budget deficit 
level can not be detected due to the effects of the CBA, then we would expect 
significant connection between the two variables once we only observe the cases 
without a CBA. However as it can be seen below the results show no connection even 
for the six CEE countries without a CBA. 
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2002 2003 2004 2005 Average
Czech Rep. 42 41 43 48 43,50
Estonia 32 32 30 44 34,50
Hungary 55 33 31 27 36,50
Latvia 37 40 35 44 39,00
Lithuania 36 37 29 24 31,50
Poland 28 23 16 29 24,00
Slovakia 19 17 18 26 20,00
Slovenia 45 50 43 56 48,50
Satisfaction with democracy* 
 
* Percentage of respondents who are very or fairly satisfied 
Source: Gyırffy [2007] p. 194 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 Average
Czech Rep. -6,8 -12,5 -3 -3,2 -6,38
Estonia 1,5 2,6 1,7 1,1 1,73
Hungary -8,5 -6,5 -5,4 -6,1 -6,63
Latvia -2,3 -1,2 -0,9 -1,2 -1,40
Lithuania -1,4 -1,2 -1,4 -2 -1,50
Poland -3,3 -4,8 -3,9 -3,6 -3,90
Slovakia -7,8 -3,8 -3,1 -4,1 -4,70
Slovenia -0,3 0,2 1,6 1,4 0,73
Fiscal balance (percent of GDP)*
 
* Adjusted for costs of pension reforms 
Source: Gyırffy [2007] p. 195 
 
 
Results for CEE-6 (without Estonia and Lithuania): 
 
X = Average satisfaction with democracy; Y = Average level of deficit 
 
Y = 0.095X – 7.078 
Sig. = 0.473 
N = 6;   R2 = 0.135 
 
 
These findings have several consequences: (1) the effects of a CBA do not override the 
effects of public trust, (2) public trust – at least the way it is measured by Gyırffy – 
does not seem to be a crucial domestic factor in determining sustainability of fiscal 
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restraint in CEE, (3) this does not mean that a CBA has no effect on fiscal restraint 
however there are several ambiguities surrounding this issue: (a) how strong is this 
disciplining effect? Does it override domestic the effect of unfavorable domestic factors 
that otherwise would predestine the country for lax fiscal policies? (b) the exogeneity / 
endogeneity issue: “It is […] possible that the countries with the potential for restrictive 
fiscal policy were those more likely to adopt fixed exchange rates.” (Grigonyté [2003] 
p. 115) 
 
 
3.4. Currency board arrangements and fiscal rules 
 
There is one more issue regarding currency boards that needs to be clarified. As it was 
mentioned during the discussion on fiscal rules, Bulgaria is the only clear case which 
does not seem to support the notion that fiscal rules determine budget balances. Since 
the introduction of the CBA in 1997 Bulgaria has shown remarkable fiscal discipline, 
nevertheless the quality of its procedural rules remained rather low. Although Bulgaria 
is not part of the eight CEE countries that was included in Gyırffy’s theory and the 
focus of my research is also rather on these eight countries, due to the small number of 
cases, Bulgaria can not be completely ignored when discussing CBA. There are two 
reasons why the case of Bulgaria does not fundamentally challenge the theory’s 
suggestion about the importance of fiscal rules: 
(1) It can be argued that the Bulgarian case does not fulfill the important criteria 
about similar external pressure. It has been discussed that during the observed period 
the eight CEE countries existed in a similar external pressure/incentive setting: none of 
them had an effective shield against market forces like the credibility of the EMU. 
Unlike any of the CEE-8 Bulgaria did experience full-scale economic crisis and 
effective collapse in 1996-1997, with collapsing currency, inflation, budget deficit and 
public debt growing out of control. With this event Bulgaria experienced substantially 
different external environment than the aforementioned countries of the region and had 
to turn to the IMF for help. The introduction of CBA was a consequence.  “The IMF 
signaled it would provide the foreign exchange reserves needed for the smooth CBA 
operation. In fact, its introduction was the condition under which the IMF would 
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continue providing financial support to Bulgaria.” (Roussenova [2002] p. 24) It is hard 
to judge whether subsequent fiscal restraint is a consequence of the automatic and 
unconditional disciplining effect of the CBA or it is the consequence of the still lasting 
effect of the crisis experience which was able to fuel consensus on fiscal restraint. In 
order to answer this question we would need another case from the region that 
experienced similar external shock. In short, the different external pressure experienced 
by Bulgaria makes the case unfit for unproblematic comparison with the CEE-9 
countries. 
(2) Since a CBA has strong implications for fiscal policy, namely under a CBA 
fiscal discipline is a well articulated interest of the government and since we have no 
reason to believe that governments are not aware of these implications, a CBA is in 
certain ways similar to fiscal rules: both are self imposed rules that limit the 
government’s discretion in fiscal policy. The important difference is that a CBA is a 
monetary arrangement, it rules are binding the monetary policy whereas it has only 
implications, not clear cut rules for fiscal policy and as the case of Argentina has shown 
these implications can be disregarded. Nevertheless I believe it can be argued that fiscal 
rules and CBA are not excluding rather complementing each other and CBAs could be 
considered as special types of fiscal rules, influencing fiscal policy although according 
to different mechanisms. Therefore a country displays fiscal discipline if it either has 
high quality fiscal rules or a CBA in place. Latvia and Slovenia use no CBA, yet they 
do have good procedural rules consequently both countries have had rather small 
deficits. Bulgaria, with low quality fiscal rules, yet a CBA in place has performed 
equally well. Lithuania with somewhat lower quality rules than Latvia or Slovenia and 
with CBA in place has shown similarly small budget deficit as Slovenia, whereas 
Estonia that has both high quality fiscal rules and a CBA has had the best fiscal balance 
in the region throughout the period.  
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4. CONCLUSION OF FISCAL RULES AND EXTERNAL PRESSURE 
 
The previous two chapters were necessary in order to see whether the two important 
preconditions of Gyırffy’s theory are also present in CEE. The first chapter dealt with 
fiscal rules: whether fiscal rules are crucially important determinants of fiscal outcomes 
also in the region. The second chapter looked at the issue of external pressure. 
According to the theory the external incentive / pressure setting for countries has to be 
fairly similar, otherwise examining the role of domestic factors in deficit levels makes 
no sense, as the external pressure overrides the effect of domestic factors. Once it is 
established that fiscal rules do determine fiscal outcomes and that countries of the 
region face similar external pressure we can focus on domestic factors.    
Based on the results of earlier researches it can be concluded that just like in 
case of old EU member states, also in CEE fiscal rules are important determinants of 
fiscal outcomes. The available data focuses on the quality of budgeting rules 
(procedural rules), which give rather comprehensive picture of countries’ fiscal rules, as 
they include the consideration of different numerical rules and the existence 
independent fiscal councils – the two other groups of fiscal rules mentioned by Gyırffy 
and other literature. Evidence shows strong positive connection between the quality of 
procedural rules and the fiscal balance in CEE.  
As far as external pressure is concerned it can be established that countries of the 
region have faced similar incentives / pressures. Preparation for EU membership did not 
provide strong incentive for fiscal restraint as it was the stated policy of the 
Commission that such consideration will have secondary importance in assessing a 
country’s readiness to join the EU and macroeconomic convergence – including fiscal 
policy – should be achieved on the medium-run. After these countries became members 
legally they are bound to comply with the Maastricht criteria and join the EMU as soon 
as possible. However weak enforcement mechanisms of the EU combined with the lack 
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of clear deadline for compliance meant that prospective EMU membership did not have 
such disciplining effect for CEE countries as for the 12 original members. The latter 
group had a clear deadline when the common currency area was formed, therefore those 
countries that indicated interest in becoming founding members had a much clearer 
incentive to comply with the criteria to avoid failure. It can be argued that as more and 
more new member states are adopting the Euro the outsider new members will have 
increasing incentive to comply with the criteria in order to avoid becoming “last in the 
class”.   
When discussing the external pressure the issue of currency board needs to be 
addressed. When testing the findings of her research Gyırffy examined the connection 
between level of public trust in a country and it’s a fiscal performance. In case of EMU 
member states she has found significant positive connection, however this was not the 
case when she tested the eight CEE countries. She suggested this is due to the fact that 
certain countries in the region have CBA in place, thus having different external 
incentives. According to her argument a CBA has such strong disciplining effect on 
fiscal policy and on the consensus regarding fiscal restraint that it is overriding even 
otherwise unfavorable domestic conditions (i.e. low public trust). Thus, it is implied 
that, in case of CEE no further investigation of domestic factors makes sense. 
Existing literature is inconsistent on whether CBA automatically enhances fiscal 
discipline and if it does to what degree. The fact that merely a CBA is not an ultimate 
remedy against lax fiscal policies is demonstrated by the case of Argentina. The 
argument that lack of correlation between public trust and fiscal balance in CEE is due 
to the effect of CBA can be effectively contested if we run the same test leaving out 
Estonia and Lithuania – the two countries with a CBA – of the sample. Although the 
number of cases is even lower than before - which should warn us from making far 
fetched conclusions – the results still seem to be quite unequivocal, that there is no 
connection between public trust and budget deficit. It means that the CBA is not the 
ultimate problem, rather it can be suspected that public trust – at least the way it is 
measured by Gyırffy – is not such crucial determinant in the region as it could be 
suspected based on the theory.  Nevertheless - based on the literature – it can be 
assumed that a CBA does have some fiscal disciplining effect due to its rather obvious 
implications for fiscal policy. Furthermore it has to be assumed that governments are 
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aware of these implications and that introduction of a CBA – if they aim to keep the 
arrangement in place - will limit their discretion regarding fiscal policy. In that sense we 
can consider the CBA as a special type of fiscal rule: consciously self imposed (thus it 
can not be considered as an external factor) and limiting fiscal policy. 
It can be established that the two important preconditions suggested by 
Gyırffy’s theory, namely the significance of fiscal rules in fiscal outcomes and the 
similarity of external pressure/incentives are fulfilled in CEE. Therefore it can be 
assumed that – in line with the logic of the theory – domestic factors are key 
determinants of variance also across CEE countries. Thus, following chapters will focus 
on domestic factors and aim to identify those that are important determinants of fiscal 
performance. The main focus will be on comparing the cases of Estonia and Hungary 
the two extremes regarding fiscal performance throughout the period. The results should 
be then used to suggest possible directions for generalization on the region. 
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5. DOMESTIC FACTORS AND DIFFUSE SUPPORT 
 
 
5.1. The theory’s suggestions regarding domestic factors 
 
So far all chapters of the current paper began with a detailed discussion of the 
framework theory’s suggestions regarding that chapter’s topic. We have no intention to 
deviate from this pattern. Since this second structural unit focuses on domestic factors 
we will start with an overview of the theory’s suggestions regarding domestic factors. 
This part contains the essence, the real value of Gyırffy’s theory therefore it is 
particularly important to understand how these domestic factors influence – according 
to Gyırffy – the fiscal performance of a country.  
So far it has been established that the quality of budgeting rules is a fundamental 
determinant of budget balance. The real question Gyırffy is aiming to answer in her 
dissertation is the following: if the connection between fiscal rules and budget balance 
is so clear (and the external pressure / incentive environment is similar enough) why do 
governments of certain countries choose to implement strict rules while others do not 
and once a government has created strong rule setting, why in certain countries 
subsequent governments respect and adhere to these rules? 
Gyırffy investigated the cases of Hungary and Sweden in order to identify the 
relevant domestic factors that explain the different choices of governments. Both 
countries needed strong fiscal adjustment in the same period around the late ‘80s / early 
‘90s and while both countries attempted to deal with the problem of unsustainably high 
budget deficits only Sweden managed to achieve lasting success, while Hungary’s fiscal 
adjustment attempts remained largely futile and could show forth only temporary 
success. Gyırffy provides further justification for her choice of Sweden as a case to 
compare it with Hungary by highlighting similarities in certain important aspects: both 
countries are small, open economies, with large state redistribution and large public 
 51 
debt. Moreover there are a number of differences that would rather presuppose that 
Hungary has higher chances of conducting a successful fiscal adjustment, e.g. Swedish 
electoral system tends to yield minority governments, Hungary is a candidate to the 
Euro Zone while Sweden is not, etc. (Gyırffy [2007] p. 139.) The results from the case 
studies were then synthesized, which provided the basis for Gyırffy’s suggestions about 
the importance of domestic factors. 
An important assumption of Gyırffy’s work is that fiscal management reforms, 
that is changing or tightening budgeting rules, do not effect any interest groups directly, 
therefore it is politically less sensitive to take this step than for instance cutting 
pensions, public sector wages or closing hospitals, etc. (Gyırffy [2007] p. 38.) 
Therefore whether these rules are tightened depends primarily on the elite’s willingness 
to do so. Consensus within the elite about the necessity of tight fiscal rules is thus the 
first important domestic factor. The government in power has to be sure that once 
tightened fiscal rules are in place - which by the way tie the government’s own hands in 
spending - the opposition will respect these rules and will not deviate from the 
consensus by trying to win votes with populist promises. If there is any considerable 
political force that is outside of the consensus then the government has no incentive to 
make tight rules as it would only create a situation where the government maneuvers 
itself into a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis the opposition. 
Having such consensus is however only the first necessary condition and the 
easier one to achieve: a looming crisis for instance can lead to a situation where the 
elites put aside their conflicts and work out a temporary consensus to avoid the worst. 
Lasting change in fiscal performance however can only be achieved if the consensus is 
persistent. The other important domestic factor, the level of diffuse support for the 
system in the society, determines whether a society is capable of upholding such lasting 
consensus. As it has been mentioned earlier in this paper Gyırffy uses for her theory 
David Easton’s concept of diffuse support, who defined it as a certain trust of the 
society towards the system, wherein the members are convinced that the current system 
generates outputs favorable for them in the long run even if sometimes the immediate 
measures are unfavorable for them. (The next section will discuss the issue of diffuse 
support in details.) In a society where diffuse support is high – according to Gyırffy – 
long term thinking is more appreciated than in an environment characterized by low 
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diffuse support. That is, in the latter case it is easier to buy votes with populist promises 
that yield benefits for the electorate only on the short run, since voters do not believe 
anyways that the system will provide them any benefits on the long run. Such promises 
however are impossible to make if strict budgeting and generally strict fiscal rules are in 
place, therefore a low diffuse support environment provides considerable incentive for 
different groups of the elite to deviate from the original consensus that favored fiscal 
restraint. 
The above suggestions of the theory regarding the importance of these two 
domestic factors were then tested by Gyırffy. As first step the two factors, elite 
consensus and trust (Gyırffy uses trust interchangeably with diffuse support, which is 
not entirely correct, as it will be explained later), had to be operationalized. In case of 
the former Gyırffy’s method is quite simple: she assumes that the level of average 
budget deficit indicates the degree of consensus within the elite about the importance of 
fiscal restraint. This approach can be supported by the argument that since high 
correlation has been detected between deficit level and quality of budgeting rules, better 
rule setting presupposes higher degree of consensus. The latter – diffuse support - has 
been measured through the results of Eurobarometer surveys regarding satisfaction with 
democracy: the share of population that is either “very satisfied” or “fairly satisfied” has 
been considered being satisfied with democracy in the respective country. For each of 
the 12 founding EMU member state the average level of satisfaction with democracy 
was calculated for the period between 1998 and 2005. These figures were then set 
against the average budget deficit levels of these countries for the same period and the 
relationship of the two datasets was investigated through a simple linear regression 
analysis. (For the dataset used by Gyırffy see Apendix D.) It was found that “public 
trust in the system [or diffuse support] explains over 56 percent of the variation in fiscal 
deficits” (Y = 0.139X – 9.234; R2=0.561, Sig. = 0.005). (Gyırffy [2007] p. 192.) There 
might be different views on exactly how strong support this result provides for the 
hypothesis, nevertheless 56 percent indicates significant connection – even if one 
disagrees with the rather optimistic assessment of Gyırffy that it provides “strong 
support”.  
As it was discussed earlier in this paper the same test was ran on eight Central 
and Eastern European countries yet the analysis failed to show similar connection 
 53 
between diffuse support and budget balance. It was also mentioned that Gyırffy 
explained this discrepancy with the influence of currency board arrangements in certain 
countries of the region and a large section of the third chapter argues that this 
suggestion is invalid. Thus the question arises: if Gyırffy’s explanation for the 
discrepancy is invalid dos this mean that the whole theory should be dismissed as false? 
The current paper argues that it would not be reasonable to discredit the theory. As it 
will be seen in later chapters the cases of Estonia and Hungary in many ways actually 
support the notion. It is quite likely that the main source of problem is Gyırffy’s way of 
operationalizing the relevant domestic factors. The following section investigates this 
issue by taking a closer look at the theory that served as a basis for Gırffy’s work, that 
is, David Easton’s concept of diffuse support.  
 
 
5.2. David Easton’s concept 
 
David Easton first elaborated the concept of diffuse support in his book ‘A 
Systems Analysis of Political Life’7 In this work his main concern was to examine how 
different political systems manage to persist. According to him most of the political 
research “is concerned with exploring all those intricate subsidiary processes through 
which decisions are made and put into effect [however] theory needs to know how it 
comes about that any kind of system can persist long enough to continue to make such 
decisions”. (Easton [1979] p. 31.) It is far beyond the scope of this paper to discuss 
Easton’s entire work in detail. What is important here that Easton viewed the political 
life as an open and adaptive system, where all the elements are interconnected and 
reinforce each other. In an optimal case such a system can meet the challenges imposed 
by stress (disturbances) and can continue to exist. Support and within that diffuse 
support is only one – albeit very important – element of the system. In a brief and 
extremely simplified manner Easton’s political system can be described as following: 
political systems exist in an environment with innumerable events and conditions. The 
inputs of the system concentrate and capture the effect of everything that is relevant 
from the environment as political stress. There are two major types of inputs: demands 
                                                 
7
 The book was first published in 1965 however for the purpose of this research a second edition from 
1979 was used: Easton [1979]. 
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and support. Demands are channeled into the political system, where they are converted 
into outputs by the authorities (i.e. decisions and actions by the authorities). The outputs 
then influence the environment through a feedback loop influencing thus inputs 
(altering or creating new demands, changing support).  
 
 
 
From the above scheme for our purpose only the suggestions regarding support 
are interesting, thus in the following section the focus will be on this aspect of Easton’s 
political system. (It can be noted here that the bulk of ‘A System’s Analysis of Political 
Life’ deals with the issue of support, thus it might be argued that support is the most 
important element of Easton’s system anyways.) A decade after the first publication of 
his book, due to the special attention received by the concept of support (its increased 
use in empirical research) and the ambiguities persisting around it, Easton further 
elaborated on the issue of separating diffuse from specific support in an article; Easton 
[1975]. These two sources will be used here to specify the concept of (diffuse) support. 
 
 
5.2.1. Support, its objects, and stress on support 
 
Support as an input variable has essential importance, since no political system 
can persist without at least a certain level of support. Thus decline of support is 
considered a major stress on the system which can threaten its persistence. Support for a 
political system is constituted by support for three political objects: support for the 
authorities, the regime and the political community. Relatively stable support for the 
authorities is necessary, so that some sort of continuity of decision makers / 
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administrators exists, otherwise demands can not be processed into outputs. Support for 
the regime, that is, the rules and structures of demand conversion is also essential and 
last but not least without maintaining some minimal cohesion within the membership of 
the political community, that is without support for the political community, no system 
can exist. A vague hierarchy of objects is implied, wherein loss of support for the 
political community or the regime poses a more fundamental threat for the system than 
decline of support merely for the authorities. 
Disturbances in the environment or in the system itself that threaten the 
persistence of a system are called stress by Easton. Stress on support in this sense is the 
decline of support below a critical level. An important source of decline in support is 
output failure. Output failure occurs when the authorities either fail to take action to 
meet the demands of members or their actions are incompatible with demands. This is 
important for us because Easton identifies cleavages, or the lack of consensus as major 
drivers of output failure. Thus consensus appears as an important factor not only in 
Gyırfy’s work, but also in Easton’s system theory. What is missing from Gyırffy’s 
work is that consensus can influence the level of support, insofar as the level of 
consensus influences the potential danger of stress on support.  Easton does not suggest 
that social diversity or group conflicts necessarily have negative consequences on 
output. Nevertheless there is a danger that “cleavages may so divide the relevant 
members that they find themselves unable to cooperate, negotiate, or compromise their 
differences even to the minimal extent necessary so as to discover some kind of 
acceptable output resolution”. (Easton [1979] p. 233)  
 
 
5.2.2. Specific and diffuse support 
 
It is necessary to differentiate between two types of support: specific and diffuse. 
The need for such differentiation arouses from the fact that often, even though members 
of a political system are dissatisfied with certain policies or their life (generally with the 
outputs), this political discontent does not necessarily lead to fundamental political 
changes, as confidence in the regime or the political community is unharmed. Such 
phenomenon is the manifestation of the existence of two types, two levels of support. In 
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short: specific support is directly related to what the authorities do and how they do it, 
while diffuse support is more fundamental in character, directed to basic aspects of the 
system. The source of specific support on one hand is the membership’s ability to 
directly link outputs to their demands, thus emphasis is on specific actions. On the other 
hand specific support is also based on the authorities’ perceived general performance. 
Even if direct causal relation between the actions of the authorities and the outcomes is 
harder to establish the members of the system might blame or praise the authorities, the 
government for their present conditions. Whereas diffuse support is a broad political 
good will, a diffuse attachment to the regime and community that makes members 
tolerating outputs that are perceived to run contrary to one’s wants and demands. “It 
consists of a reserve of support that enables a system to weather the many storms when 
outputs cannot be balanced of against inputs of demands. It is a kind of support that a 
system does not have to buy with more or less direct benefits for the obligations and 
responsibilities the member incurs.” (Easton [1979] p. 273.)  
Without diffuse support and based solely on specific support no system can 
persist, it is however possible that a system temporarily survives on specific support 
alone, which in an optimal case will bread – after a while - diffuse support as well. 
Differentiating between the two types of supports has another important aspect for the 
current research. In countries where the political system has changed recently, 
governments usually face the problem that the level of output is inadequate, it does not 
meet demands. This is usually due to the inexperience of new authorities and/or the 
chaotic political/economic circumstances usually surrounding political system change. 
As a consequence specific support for the new system is usually low however this is 
offset - in an optimal case - by the high diffuse support, large reservoir of good will 
towards the new system. Indeed it is quite logical to assume that around its birth a new 
system enjoys such diffuse support – the amount of this sort of diffuse support is 
however highly dependent on the circumstances surrounding the birth of the new 
system. 
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5.2.3. Dimensions of diffuse support 
 
It is not explicitly stated, but from Easton’s works it seems that the object of 
specific support is mostly the authorities, whereas the objects of diffuse support are both 
the offices and their occupants, but especially the regime and the political community. 
In the first chapter of this paper it was mentioned that Gyırffy equates diffuse support 
with trust. This is not uncommon among other scholars either however this is not 
entirely in line with Easton’s concept. Trust – according to Easton - is only a dimension 
of diffuse support, a form of diffuse support for the authorities and the regime. In the 
presence of trust “members feel that their own interests would be attended to even if the 
authorities were exposed to little supervision or scrutiny. For the regime, such trust 
would reveal itself as symbolic satisfaction with the processes by which the country is 
run.” (Easton [1975] p. 447) The other form of diffuse support for the authorities and 
the regime is belief in their legitimacy or “the conviction on the part of the member that 
it is right and proper for him to accept and obey the authorities and to abide by the 
requirements of the regime.” (Easton [1979] p. 278) Thus trust and belief in legitimacy 
are two forms of diffuse support for the authorities and the regime. Diffuse support for 
the third (and most fundamental) political object - the political community – may appear 
as a sense of “we-feeling”, common consciousness or group identification. In order to 
be able to operationalize diffuse support understanding of these dimensions is essential, 
as “the political object will govern the mode of expression of diffuse support.” (Easton 
[1975] p. 447) 
The above summary might have been somewhat dense nevertheless it is important 
to have at least an overview of Easton’s theory and where in it the concept of support 
has its place. This is important because – as it was mentioned before – the suspicion 
arouse that Gyırffy’s choice of indicator for diffuse support, the way she 
operationalized it is not in line with Easton’s suggestions therefore it is inappropriate for 
measuring diffuse support. In order to highlight the problems associated with Gyırffy’s 
operationalization, below the most important properties of diffuse support were 
synthesized from Easton’s works:  
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 Diffuse support is independent of the effects of daily outputs - at least in the 
short and medium run. 
 It is not easily depleted through disappointment with outputs. 
 It is more stable and less fluctuating/volatile than specific support - although 
there might be cases where a sudden frustration results in dramatic drop in 
diffuse support. 
 It is a sentiment. While specific support is given for returns (direct link to 
outputs or at least perceived outputs) diffuse support is offered because of 
affective ties to an object in and of itself.  
 
This last point implies that capturing diffuse support through opinion polls is 
particularly problematic. If a question inquiries about how the members assess a certain 
institution or the system itself (as it happens for instance in the eurobarometer question 
used by Gyırffy) it is quite inevitable that the answer will be to a large extent based on 
the perceived outputs of that object (institution, the entire system, etc.). It can happen 
that public opinion polls reflect low trust in parliament, political parties, government, 
etc. but still maintain diffuse support towards the system. An additional problem with 
Gyırffy’s way of measurement is that it does not fulfill the requirement of sufficient 
stability.  In the few years’ data presented by Gyırffy there can be quite substantial 
changes in the values from year to year in CEE (see Appendix D), which suggests that 
this indicator is rather connected to specific outputs of certain years, than to the deeper 
diffuse support.   
Even though Gyırffy’s explanation about the importance of CBA does not seem 
to hold, it is still a fact that the connection between trust and deficit can not be detected 
in CEE, at least not the way Gyırffy measures it. Thus the question arouses: does this 
mean the entire theory is wrong or does the problem lie elsewhere? As it was mentioned 
before, this paper argues that the latter is the case: the main suggestions of the theory 
are relevant also in CEE, that is successful, lasting fiscal adjustment through 
strengthening fiscal rules requires elite consensus and high diffuse support in a society. 
However it seems that Gyırffy’s way of measuring diffuse support is incorrect. The 
following chapter will compare the cases of Estonia and Hungary. On one hand these 
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cases support the theory on the other hand they can be useful for identifying new ways 
to operationalize diffuse support.  
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6. DOMESTIC FACTORS IN ESTONIA AND HUNGARY 
 
 
6.1. Overview of the past two decades 
 
In the first section of this chapter a brief overview will be taken of fiscal 
developments in Estonia and Hungary since the beginning of transition. Estonia is the 
simpler case. Since the introduction of the national currency, the Kroon, in June 1992 
and the choice of currency board arrangement, Estonia has been characterized by fiscal 
discipline exceptional among transition countries and rare even in whole Europe. As 
data shows the general government’s budget exhibited surplus in most years, while 
deficit remained marginal in other years. (See Appendix A) The only exception is 1999, 
when deficit reached a slightly higher level due to the 1998 Russian crisis which had hit 
Baltic economies particularly strongly. The remarkable determination of Estonian 
governments towards fiscal discipline has also been reflected in the budget balances 
during the years of the current economic crisis. Despite the huge economic contraction 
experienced by Estonia the country managed to keep its budget balance within the 3% 
limit set by the Maastricht criteria – almost unparalleled in the EU - both in 2008 and 
2009. Considering that Estonia still has the lowest level of sovereign debt among all EU 
member states one can imagine the constraint this fiscal discipline has put on the 
country in recent years. 
The picture is very different in Hungary8. When discussing recent fiscal issues in 
the Hungarian economy one needs to go back a few decades in time since the inertia of 
certain developments during the communist period still seems to exist and determines 
the current situation. It is widely known that since the early ‘60s Hungary had been a 
frontrunner in economic reforms among countries of the soviet block. The main reason 
behind this had been the effects of the 1956 uprising, more precisely the regime’s fear 
                                                 
8
 A substantial part of this section is based on the chapter in Gyırffy’s work concerning Hungarian 
developments (Gyırffy [2007] p. 111-137) When other source was used it is indicated by reference. 
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that such event might happen again. Therefore from the ‘60s on constant raise of living 
standards became the main aim of the regime. (Kornai [1995]) It was hoped that 
economic reforms will secure the necessary resources however when the first oil price 
shock hit the soviet block economies and demand decreased for their low-quality export 
the leadership decided to keep financing the system by borrowing from foreign 
creditors. (Muraközy [2004] p. 15)  Increase in wealth of the masses in a socialist 
system was of course only possible through high state redistribution. This strategy of 
high redistribution and financing wealth or consumption through accumulation of debt 
continued for the rest of the communist period. These tendencies were reflected in the 
fast increase in social expenditure. While in 1980 they amounted to 15% of the GDP a 
decade later they exceeded 25% which was 25% higher than the OECD average and 
equaled the levels of Austria, Denmark and Germany! (Muraközy [2008] p. 156-157) 
As a consequence, at the time of the changes the new democratic Hungary had an 
enormous sovereign debt burden (73% of the GDP in 1989 – OECD) and high level of 
redistribution (Government expenditure was over 63% in 1989 – OECD). This legacy 
has undoubtedly put a huge burden on the new governments and limited their space of 
maneuvering in fiscal policy. 
Since the beginning of transition one of the weakest spots of Hungarian 
economic policy has constantly been fiscal policy. Subsequent governments were 
unable to reach lasting success in deficit reduction. Out of the 15 years where we have 
trustworthy, comparable data, Hungary exhibited the worst deficit seven times and in 
most other years the country was among the worst performers. (See Appendix A). The 
new democratically elected government first attempted to take measures in order to 
reduce the deficit however it quickly backed off in face of social resistance. The most 
famous manifestation was the blockade of the cab drivers in October 1990 who 
paralyzed Budapest as a response to drastic rise in petrol prices. (Romsics [2005] p. 
561) After 1990 the economic situation worsened, by 1992 the economy contracted by 
20% and the government decided not to take measures that would put additional burden 
on the population. This policy seemed to prevail under the subsequent governments 
even though substantial reduction in social expenditures would have been necessary in 
order to balance the budget. Yet even during the second decade after the regime change 
level of state redistribution and social expenditure remained well above OECD and the 
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region’s average. (See for instance Muraközy [2008] p. 164; Barabás et al [2008] p. 14) 
Muraközy [2008] labeled Hungary as an “early born welfare state”, wherein the level 
and structure of redistribution, social benefits, etc. resembles that of the most developed 
European welfare states while the actual level of economic development corresponds 
that of developing countries. The chart below shows the wide gap between Estonia and 
Hungary concerning the level of redistribution (level of government expenditure). 
While high level of redistribution does not necessarily mean higher deficit (as the 
example of Sweden shows) the chart certainly reflects the difference in economic policy 
approach in the two countries.  
 
 
Source: EuroStat 
 
There were two exceptions during the past 20 years when serious and promising 
attempt were made for fiscal adjustment. In March 1995 a fiscal stabilization package 
was introduced by the finance minister Lajos Bokros (hence the popular name: 
“Bokros-package”). The package included devaluation of the currency, an 8% import 
surcharge, strict restriction of wages and an aim to redesign welfare spending. (Kornai 
[1995]) All of these measures affected the population strongly. Even though some of the 
proposed measures did not pass the constitutional court a large part of the package was 
introduced and the economy was eventually stabilized. The stabilization however came 
with a price: Bokros was hugely unpopular and in 1996 had to resin from the position of 
finance minister. In 1998 the socialist-liberal coalition that governed the country in 
1994-98 was defeated by the conservative FIDESZ not least because the unpopular 
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Bokros-package could be well used against the socialists in the campaign. Still, for a 
few years it seemed that this adjustment was enough to put the country on the right 
track: economic growth picked up after the first shock and budget deficit started to 
decrease. Before the 2002 elections however growing number of signs showed that the 
old reflexes are returning. Real wages started to increase by an incredible pace due to 
doubling minimum wage in 2001-2002 and massive salary increases in the public 
sector. (Antal [2004] p. 7-9)9 These tendencies continued after the elections. (Further 
50% wage increase in the public sector!) The lesson that parties learned from earlier 
experiences was that short term promises to the electorate can buy votes and unpopular 
measures should be avoided by all means. This tendency of “vote purchase” particularly 
before elections is illustrated well by the following chart: 
 
 
Source: EuroStat 
 
The main reason behind the socialist-liberal government’s final decision to give green 
light to the stabilization package lies in the growing international pressure. In 1994 
Mexico was hit by a crisis and by this time the twin deficit (fiscal and current account 
deficits) reached such a level that in the financial world Hungary suddenly moved to the 
center of attention as potentially the next country to be hit by a crisis. (Kornai [1995] p. 
16) The government acted unilaterally. As later developments showed, no wider 
consensus with the opposition existed about the necessity of the stabilization package. 
                                                 
9
 Gyırffy quoting Antal [2004] 
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This why fiscal responsibility could not be institutionalized and the Bokros-package 
could only have temporary impact.  
The next serious attempt for fiscal adjustment was also connected to external 
factors namely the current financial and economic crisis. Due to the traditionally lax 
fiscal policy pursued by Hungarian governments and the continuously high sovereign 
debt, Hungary was exceptionally vulnerable when the crisis unfolded and was among 
the first countries having to apply for IMF bailout. In return  and to avoid the fate of 
Greece the government had to accept the terms set by the IMF, which above all included 
sharp reduction of deficit. As a result Hungary has been praised for its determination 
and visible improvement of fiscal position. It is still too early to say whether the current 
adjustment brings about lasting changes in Hungarian fiscal policy, nevertheless the 
signs are not necessarily good. Once again wide consensus is absent and the new 
government taking office in May 2010 announced its intention to renegotiate terms with 
the IMF in order to substantially increase deficit target for coming years.     
It is true that the circumstances of the two countries were in many ways very 
different in the beginning of transition (first and foremost the heavy indebtedness 
inherited by the new democratic government of Hungary should be mentioned here) 
moreover this paper certainly does not suggest that one mere factor determines fiscal 
balance of a country. Nevertheless it is still remarkable that throughout the two decades 
of transition these strong differences in the fiscal balance so stubbornly persisted. It is 
widely accepted that fiscal issues are strongly connected to politics and the above 
overview, particularly the overview of Hungarian developments, seems to support this 
notion. In her theory Gyırffy attempted to reveal the mechanism of how this connection 
works between politics, society and fiscal policy. In the following section Estonian and 
Hungarian developments will be discussed in connection to consensus the first major 
domestic factor suggested by Gyırffy’s theory. 
 
 
6.2. Elite Consensus 
 
A minimum level of consensus within the elite about the general direction of economic 
policy including fiscal policy is a crucial (although not sufficient) condition for 
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successful and persistent fiscal consolidation. Moreover - as it has been mentioned 
earlier - according to Easton, consensus is not merely a dependent variable influenced 
by diffuse support, but the connection works to both directions: lack of consensus or 
cleavages in the society can have negative impacts that hinder the emergence of diffuse 
support towards the system. Therefore, when investigating the state of elite consensus in 
Estonia and Hungary, attention should be also devoted to the existing cleavages within 
these societies as they are the two sides of the same coin. In line with Gyırffy’s theory, 
the hypothesis here should be that while Estonia enjoys strong elite consensus regarding 
economic policy, enabling persistent fiscal restraint, the Hungarian elite is disrupted and 
serious cleavages are in the way of necessary consensus. 
 
 
6.2.1. Consensus in Estonia 
 
At first glance the suggestion that the Estonian society is substantially less affected by 
serious cleavages than the Hungarian seems odd. Indeed while Hungary is ethnically 
relatively homogenous, quite the opposite is true for Estonia, where the share of the 
titular ethnic group is the second lowest in Europe. Moreover it is clear that the issues 
arising due to this ethnic division pose just as serious and complex challenges for the 
Estonia as any other current social problem potentially can for the Hungarian society. 
Nevertheless it should not be forgotten that according to Easton’s concept only 
politically relevant members matter in issues that concern the political system, for 
instance regarding cleavages or diffuse support. The issue of the non-Estonian (mostly 
Russian-speaking) population will be discussed later more in details. For now it should 
be accepted that this share of the population – strictly from the perspective of the 
current paper - does not constitute a politically highly relevant group, therefore the 
ethnic division by itself does not exclude the possibility that Estonia has a cleavage 
structure more favorable than that of Hungary. 
In their 2004 analysis of Estonian politics Mikko Lagerspetz and Henri Vogt 
focus exactly on the issue of cleavages within the society which makes that paper 
extremely useful for our purposes. Their main point is in line with the diagnosis of 26 
Estonian thinkers that was elaborated in an open letter in 2001, namely that the most 
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important cleavage in Estonia is a horizontal one, which separates the elite from the rest 
of the population. The letter accuses the elite – and not just the government in power – 
of being alienated from the masses and being indifferent to the problems of ordinary 
people.10 Without intending to objectively evaluate the validity of the above criticism 
the current paper agrees that such horizontal cleavage exists within the Estonian society 
and more importantly for the current research: no impenetrable division exist within the 
elite itself. Lagerspetz and Vogt emphasise two basic characteristics of the Estonian 
political landscape: the monolithic nature of the political elite and the distorted 
spectrum of politics that tilts towards the political right. It seems temptingly easy to 
measure political stability of countries through the stability of governments or how 
often governments are changed in a given period. Based on the large number of 
governments since regaining independence one could indeed have the impression of 
relative political instability in Estonia compared to other countries in the region. 
However, as Lagerspetz and Vogt pointed out: “in economic policy Estonia has 
followed a straight course despite the regular changes of government”. (Lagerspetz and 
Vogt [2004] p. 74) This is exactly what needs to be understood under the “monolithic 
nature” of the Estonian politics: there is no real polarization of parties, which - at the 
same time - means that there is a consensus among the elite in key areas, first and 
foremost in economic policy. The unbalance of the political spectrum on one hand 
means that right wing parties have been overrepresented in the Riigikogu since 
regaining independence (see for instance Mikkel [2006]), that substantially more 
Estonians identify themselves with the political right than with the left (Vihalemm et al 
[1997] p. 208). On the other hand it also means that the prevailing economic policy, 
which enjoyed hegemony under any government during the past 20 years, is essentially 
a right-wing policy, favoring market liberalism or laissez-fair capitalism. (Lauristin and 
Vihalemm [2010]) It goes without saying that such economic policy that promotes a 
small state and low level of redistribution is much more favorable for pursuing strict 
fiscal policy than a more socially sensitive, more “left-wing” policy, where more 
emphasis is put on easing inequalities, protecting the “losers of transition” through large 
social transfers. (It has to be noted here that the framework theory presumes a more or 
less stable consensus among economists about the superiority of government wage and 
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 Lagerspetz and Vogt quoting the open letter published in Postimees on April 23, 2001.  
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social transfer decrease, as most promissing way for sustainable financing of deficit – 
Gyırrfy [2007] p. 20; also Alesina and Perotti [1996])   Moreover this is not simply a 
situation where the political right outbalances the left, as “even the ‘left’ options have 
been clearly market-economy and nationally oriented – to the extent, in fact, that in 
many countries these parties might qualify as steadfast right-wingers”. (Lagerspetz and 
Vogt [2004] p. 67) The results of the 1995 parliamentary elections (that resulted in a 
coalition government led by the winner of the election the Estonian Coalition Party) 
were dubbed by contemporary observers11 as a turn to the left. It could be observed in 
many transition countries – including Hungary – that in the second election after the 
political changes the dissatisfied voters brought back the post-communists into power. 
(It can be of course argued to what extent this Estonian coalition can be considered as 
“post-communist”) In Estonia however this change in the government did not bring 
along any change in economic policy and the liberal, market-oriented policies were 
continued. (Lauristin and Vihalemm [1997] p. 114)   
The monolithic nature, the lack of polarization of Estonian politics manifests 
itself in the party structure. Until 2003 there were five significant parties dominating 
politics: Pro Patria, Reform Party, the Moderates, the Center Party and the People’s 
Union. (In 2003 the Res Publica as a newcomer criticized all other parties for their 
corruption however they quickly failed politically – Lauristin and Vihalemm [2010] p. 
15) Among these only the Center Party looked like that it could potentially offer an 
alternative as it was the only party left out of any government coalition between 1995 
and 2002. Moreover the party has been considered as a more left-wing oriented 
formation, that is, the voice of ordinary people, who do not belong to the winners of the 
new market-capitalism. This illusion was however blown to pieces when in January 
2002 the Center Party and the Reform Party (the biggest advocate of market-liberalism) 
formed an unlikely coalition. Thus it became clear that seeming ideological barriers are 
of secondary importance, each party can step into coalition with any other party 
therefore we can speak of no real alternative in the political scene as far as economic 
policy is concerned. (Lagerspetz and Vogt [2004] p. 64-67) Further empirical evidence 
in support of this notion can be cited looking at voter behavior, more precisely electoral 
volatility. Electoral volatility refers to the share of voters who vote for a different party 
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 Lauristin and Vihalemm refer to Laar [1996] and Nelson [1996] 
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than in the previous election. The Estonian political system is characterized by high 
electoral volatility. (Mikkel [2006] p. 43; at the same time an index created by Powell 
and Tucker [2009] indicates, that while Estonian electoral volatility is among the higher 
ones, it is by no means exceptional in the region.) This is a logical development in a 
system where no major vertical cleavage exists between significant political parties, 
none of whom questions the fundaments of the prevailing consensus and where in 
consequence long-term electoral loyalty has no importance.  
At this point it is also timely to return to the issue of the mainly Russian-
speaking non-Estonian population. Why does the undoubtedly existing and important 
ethnic cleavage not pose a serious threat to the current consensus of the elite? Why does 
the Russian-speaking population not form a politically relevant group? It is not implied 
that Russian-speakers as individuals are not politically significant, they might be 
(provided they have the right to vote). However Russian speakers did not emerge in the 
political scene as a distinct group. There is no significant Russian party that effectively 
articulates specific Russian demands characteristically different from that of Estonian 
parties, thus challenging the current consensus. One reason is undoubtedly the low 
number of citizens among Russian-speakers. Nowadays roughly a third of the 
population that immigrated to Estonia during the Soviet times holds Estonian 
citizenship. (Foreign Ministry of Estonia) The rest has either no citizenship or chose to 
become (mainly) Russian citizens. In the early ’90s this share was obviously even 
smaller. Since only Estonian citizens are allowed to vote in parliamentary elections this 
factor has obviously influenced negatively the chances of any potential Russian party 
for gaining significant amount of votes. It can be argued however that since the 1995 
parliamentary elections there were enough Russian-speaking citizens who - with 
electoral discipline (i.e. high turnout and electoral loyalty) - could manage to secure a 
firm and significant position for at least one Russian party in Estonian politics. After a 
promising start in the 1995 (and to a lesser extent in the 1999) elections this scenario 
never became reality. (Estonian National Electoral Committee) In fact the bulk of 
Russian speaking citizens votes for mainstream Estonian parties. Although there is a 
clearly recognizable pattern, that the share of the Russian speakers is the highest among 
the supporters of the Center Party (Lagerspetz and Vogt [2004] p. 64), this does not 
make the Center Party a vessel through which the ethnic cleavage could seriously 
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threaten the prevailing consensus. For one thing – as it has been described above – the 
Center Party itself is part of this consensus, this way the Center Party rather integrates 
the Russian-speaking citizens in the Estonian consensus not the other way around. 
Moreover Russian-speakers still constitute a minority of the supporters of the Center 
Party and – although to a lesser degree – they can be found among the supporters of 
other Estonian parties as well. (Lagerspetz and Vogt [2004] p. 64) 
In conclusion: analysts of Estonian politics agree, and empirical evidence 
(election results, electoral volatility) supports that strong consensus exists within the 
political elite regarding economic policy. As a result of this consensus during the past 
almost two decades subsequent Estonian governments followed a straight path of 
market-liberalism, which is particularly favorable for pursuing tight fiscal policies. 
 
 
6.2.2. Consensus in Hungary 
 
In Hungary the situation is exactly the opposite. A major problem of Hungarian 
politics is precisely the extreme polarization of the political scene, the dominance of 
party politics in almost every sphere of life. Instead of the horizontal cleavage of 
Estonia that divides the elite from the rest of the society, Hungary as an important 
vertical cleavage, which not only splits the political elite but also the society. After the 
change of the political system step by step two big political camps emerged from the 
political scene antagonistically opposing each other. There were signs already in the 
beginning of the transition period but the pattern became clear during the 1998 
parliamentary elections. In 1990 six parties gained mandates in the parliament and no 
extreme concentration of seats could be observed at this point: there were larger parties, 
medium parties and small parties, yet none of them had extremely large weight in 
parliament. What could be observed in subsequent elections was the gradual decrease of 
parties: by 2010 only two of the original six remained in parliament. Moreover until the 
2010 elections only once did it happen that a new party, outside the original six, 
managed to get a seat in the parliament. (In 1998 the right radical Party of Hungarian 
Justice and Life received slightly more than 5% of the votes, their presence however 
lasted only for one term.) At the same time among the remaining parliamentary parties 
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an extreme concentration took place: the two biggest parties, the leading forces of the 
two political camps received 83% and 85% of the votes in the election of 2002 and 
2006 respectively. (For detailed results see Appendix E) The 2010 elections, which 
brought about major changes, will be discussed later. If we take a look at the electoral 
volatility also in Hungary we can see – again - exactly the opposite of Estonian 
developments. In line with notion of two opposing political camps the electoral 
volatility has decreased steadily and it has the lowest level in the entire region. (See 
Powell and Tucker [2009]) 
A two-party system by itself should not necessary bring along such extreme 
antagonism, however the specific problem of Hungary is the lack of any kind of value 
consensus. The main basis of orientation is relation to the previous (communist) 
political system, thus a kind of background consensus is missing, wherein the parties at 
least accept each other’s legitimacy. The fact that party politics has penetrated such 
spheres of life that in an optimal case should be politics free makes the problem worse. 
Parties have infiltrated in cultural, educational, health care institutions, science 
(including economics) and more importantly also the lower levels of public 
administration12. Individual voters are not entirely free of party influence either: as it 
has been mentioned above the system in Hungary is characterized by low electoral 
volatility and strong party loyalty. In an environment, where even basic consensus is 
absent, this has an affect, where people tend to use double standard when assessing 
political performance: abuse of power is only condemned only if the other camp’s 
politicians are involved. The result of this deep vertical cleavage is that the political 
discourse is dominated by symbols instead of specific policy issues. (Körösényi [2009] 
p. 60-66; Gyırffy [2006] p. 252-254) It has been mentioned that the basis of conflict is 
relation to the communist system. This would imply a post-communist / reformist 
conflict and some sort of left-right ideological split between the two camps. To some 
extent this is indeed true, at least on the level of official communication (although it has 
to be stated that both political camps have many figures from the “old guard”, for 
instance economic experts of both large parties are recruited from this circle – Szalai 
[1999] p. 43-45.), however this does not mean that there would exist two well definable, 
characteristically different specific policy set alternatives (e.g. in economic policy). 
                                                 
12
 To illustrate this Gyırffy refers to Fricz [2004] p. 125-129, where exact data can be found on personnel 
turnover in public sector after elections.   
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While in Estonia the lack of alternatives means that one, well defined direction prevails 
in economic policy, the antagonism in Hungary does not produce two alternatives 
instead no clear direction is defined. Labeling the economic policy pursued by one or 
the other political camp along traditional left-right divide is also problematic in 
Hungary: the political left at times appears to be more market friendly than the right 
while economic populism is practiced in both sides. This was particularly clear in the 
elections of 2002 and 2006. (Körösényi [2006]) 
The way how the two political blocks exploited every opportunity when the 
other was in government to win support with populism reflects well the above described 
lack of minimum consensus in Hungary. In 1990 when the cabdrivers blockaded 
Budapest in wake of sharply raising petrol prices, the opposition sided with the 
protesters against the newly elected government. (Romsics [2005] p. 562) After the 
blockade that government had never dared to take any measures that could trigger mass 
protests. Still people felt the harsh negative effects of transition and in 1994 voted the 
post-communists (in a coalition with the liberals) back in power in hope that the former 
reform communists will keep their promises and make transition less painful. Oddly 
enough it was this government that introduced in 1995 the tough economic adjustment 
measures. The hugely unpopular minister of finance who conducted the whole process 
had to resign soon and the opposition did not miss the chance to keep the issue alive 
until the next elections, which was won by the right-wing FIDESZ to a large extent 
because of the lively memory of the adjustment package in people’s minds. By the next 
election in 2002 both blocks have learned the lesson and the campaign both in 2002 and 
2006 became practically a competition of who can promise more to the electorate. 
(Kornai [1995]; Gyırffy [2006]; Körösényi [2006] and [2009])   
In this section the issue of elite consensus has been investigated in Estonia and 
Hungary. It was found that in line with the suggestion of Gyırffy’s theory the country 
with persistently low deficit (Estonia) enjoys a stable consensus over economic policy, 
while at the other extreme the country with permanently high deficit (Hungary) lacks 
even basic consensus. Moreover the case studies have revealed that there is direct 
connection between the existence/lack of consensus and policy choices that are 
favorable or unfavorable for fiscal discipline. Now that we have this result the following 
question arouses: how is it possible that Estonia managed to sustain the prevailing 
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consensus and it has not been challenged by any significant political force? Moreover 
why did Hungary not manage to follow the Estonian path and did not build stable 
consensus at least in basic economic policy issues? 
It was seen in the case studies that the Hungarian government in power has 
always been intensely attentive of people’s attitude, not least because the opposition has 
never been reluctant exploiting the public’s dissatisfaction with harsh (albeit often 
necessary) measures. Political forces in Hungary did find a promising political market 
segment as both camps tried to gain support by playing on the dissatisfaction of the 
citizens with unfavorable measures accompanying the undeniably difficult economic 
transition. The fact that it didn’t happen in Estonia could logically be explained by two 
factors: either the dimensions of hardships in Estonia were smaller than in Hungary or 
the Estonian society reacts differently to these hardships than the Hungarian. The first 
option can be easily dismissed. A great number of figures and indicators could be cited 
here to support that economically speaking Hungary was in an incomparably better 
situation than Estonia around the beginning of transition. At this point however it is 
enough to highlight two indicators that strongly and directly affect the population: real 
wages and inequality. 
János Kornai compared real wage decrease in five Central European countries 
(Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) between 1989 and 1993. 
Real wages decreased by far the least in Hungary: by 1993 to 85% of the 1989 level, 
while Poland and Slovenia experienced almost 30% decrease. (Kornai [1995] p. 1105) 
Yet Estonians suffered even more drastic drop: in less than two years between 1989 and 
1991 real wages fell by more than half! (Iwaskiw [1995]) As far as inequality is 
concerned the most plausible way to measure it is the widely used Gini-coefficient, 
wherein higher value means larger inequalities within the society. In Estonia the figure 
rose from 28 in 1989 to 39.3 in 2002 (the highest among the eight CEE countries that 
joined the EU in 2004), which reflects a 40% increase in inequality, while Hungary 
exhibited one of the smallest inequality increase in the region (19%) and with its 26.7 
points the Hungarian society is among the most equal ones in the region and Europe. 
(Kornai [2005] p. 923)13 Still it seems that the Estonian public was able to bear 
hardships more than the Hungarian and seems less receptive to economic populism. 
                                                 
13
 Kornai quoting data from UNICEF data base. 
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This does not mean however that equality is less important for Estonians than for 
Hungarians. Based on the results of the European Social Survey, in 200714, although 
larger proportion of the Hungarian (85%) than the Estonian (77%) respondents thought 
that the government should reduce inequalities, yet the difference is not very significant 
especially if it is put into a European context. (In a number of western European 
countries it is around 60%, while in Denmark it is below 40%.) (Lelkes [2009] p. 20)15 
As it has been discussed earlier such difference in consensus are ascribed by the 
framework theory to differences in diffuse support. In the following section we will 
look at the different explanations that are suggested by the existing literature and see 
whether these explanations can be identified as manifestations of diffuse support. If they 
are then this means that the cases of Hungary and Estonia support the validity of the 
theory. 
 
 
6.3. The background of consensus 
 
A number of interrelated factors and circumstances are brought up in the 
existing literature as explanations for the above elaborated state of consensus in the two 
countries. Synthesizing and ordering them in a logical chain will be attempted in this 
section nevertheless due to their complex interrelation it is not an easy task.  
Towards the end of their analysis of Estonian politics Lagerspetz and Vogt 
mention the important and often quoted term ‘period of extraordinary politics’, which 
has been introduced by the Polish economist (deputy prime minister and minister of 
finance) Leszek Balczerowicz. They paraphrase Balczerowicz’s definition as following:  
“great changes in a country’s history create a reserve of political capital at the disposal 
of the government in charge. This reserve enables the government to apply radical and 
drastic measures of economic reform, if concentrated in the period of extraordinary 
politics shortly after this historical change.” (Lagerspetz and Vogt [2004] p. 80)16 The 
                                                 
14
 The results reflect values of the respondents. Since it is assumed that values do not change in the short-
run, we can assume that results of the 2007 survey also reflect by and large the attitude of Estonians and 
Hungarians regarding inequality in the beginning of transition.  
15
 Lelkes quoting results from ESS third wave. 
16
 Lagerspetz and Vogt paraphrasing Balczerowicz [1993] 
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striking similarities between Balczerowicz’s concept of extraordinary politics and 
Easton’s – earlier quoted - definition of diffuse support can not go unnoticed.  
A major point of Lagerspetz and Vogt is that this period of extraordinary politics 
still exists in Estonia to some extent. “Large parts of the population are still ready to 
accept such decisions by the government that they would otherwise basically resist, 
provided that these decisions seem to strengthen the country’s independence.” 
(Lagerspetz and Vogt [2004] p. 80) A major source – they continue – of the persistence 
of this period is the perceived Russian threat, the deep-seated historical lesson that 
independence can not be taken for granted and it is best to be dependent on Russia as 
little as possible. This factor was presumably even stronger in the early period of 
transition, prior to 1994, the withdrawal of Russian troops from Estonian soil. First of 
all the issue of troop withdrawal was kept open until the very last moment by the 
Kremlin and this uncertainty definitely did not help in easing the threat felt by many 
Estonians. (Galbreath [2005]) Moreover the early ’90s was still generally a quite 
uncertain period in CEE. The former Yugoslavia descended into a bloody ethnic 
conflict and in Moldova the Transnistrian separatists were openly backed by the 
Russian troops stationed in the region. Statements of certain Russian officials also did 
not help to ease the tensions. A member of Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s infamous Liberal 
Democratic Party, Petr Rozhok, for instance openly encouraged veterans of the Soviet 
army staying in Estonia to form armed militias. (Galbreath [2005]) p. 194) After the 
troop-withdrawal Estonian fears of direct military threat might eased somewhat, 
however they were far from disappearing. According to a poll conducted in 1996 most 
Estonians – although to a varying degree – still believed Russia is a threat to Estonia. 
(Kirch [1997] p. 152) One major reason behind this is that the external Russian threat is 
inseparable from the issue of the large number of Russian-speaking population within 
the borders of Estonia. Again, opinions of ethnic Estonians surely vary on a wide scale 
concerning the threat level the Russian-speaking population presumably poses to 
Estonia, nevertheless according to a 2000 poll only 37% of ethnic Estonians is fully 
convinced about the loyalty of Russian-speakers to Estonia. (Budryte [2005] p. 91) 
Lagerspetz and Vogt assumed that the NATO-accession of Estonia will render the 
Russian threat irrelevant and this will end the period of extraordinary politics in Estonia. 
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As it is known the 2007 bronze soldier incident had an opposite affect and reminded the 
Estonian society of the seriousness of the ethnic cleavage.   
Besides the extension of the period of extraordinary politics the perceived 
Russian threat has had another major consequence for the Estonian transition. An 
external enemy usually tends to strengthen the cohesion of a group. The fact that there is 
a “them” and an “us”, that the two groups are well defined and easily separable, feeds 
the “we feeling” of the threatened group. Identity politics has had great importance in 
Estonian transition. “The foundational myth of Estonia is based on unanimity, on ‘One 
Estonia’ against outside oppressors, a small community of people surrounded by great 
powers.” (Lagerspetz and Vogt [2004] p. 74) Even after the mythological stage of 
transition (Vihalemm et al [1997]) ended and public trust in political institutions 
(parliament, political parties, etc.) deteriorated this notion continues to be important. 
(Lagerspetz and Vogt [2004] p. 74-75) Such strong “we-feeling” – as it has been 
mentioned already in connection with Easton’s concept – is a manifestation of diffuse 
support for the political community, the most fundamental of the three objects of diffuse 
support. (The other two are: the authorities and the regime.) 
In Hungary no similar external factor was present during the transition. It is true 
that Soviet troops stationed in the country and their withdrawal was the essential interest 
of the new democracy, however – unlike in Estonia – the issue was solved quite early. 
Actual withdrawal started already in early 1989 and agreement about the exact timetable 
was signed in March 1990, finally by June 1991 the last soviet soldier (and all family 
members) left the country. (Romsics [2005] p. 577) In 1991 with the dissolution of the 
Warsaw Pact, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and finally the Soviet Union 
itself the Kremlin’s influence disappeared in Hungary and its neighborhood practically 
overnight. This development also meant that no external threat factor was present to 
strengthen the cohesion of Hungarian society or to prolong the period of extraordinary 
politics, both of which make a society more likely to endure temporary economic 
hardships.   
The above discussion leads us to another important factor that influences the 
length and intensity of the period of extraordinary politics: the degree to which the 
transition fulfilled the society’s expectations. It has been discussed earlier that outputs 
of a system, that is, specific decisions and measures taken by the authorities, feed 
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specific support. In case of a system change however the output level of the new 
authorities is quite low or dissatisfactory for various reasons (inexperience, general 
economic/political/social chaos often surrounding system changes, etc.). Therefore 
political good will or diffuse support towards the new system is crucial in its survival 
until the new system is able to generate favorable outputs and gather sufficient specific 
support as well. As we know diffuse support is largely based on a sentiment. It is a 
positive attitude towards the political community, a strong sense of community, of 
belonging together. It is moreover a belief in the legitimacy of the authorities and the 
regime that they are in the common interest of the nation, of “our people”. The level of 
diffuse support for a new regime depends on how much it is able to evoke such 
sentiments in the members. (Easton [1979]) It is therefore very important to investigate 
whether such expectations of the Estonian and Hungarian societies were fulfilled by the 
new systems or not. Fulfilling certain expectations might reminds us to the mechanism 
of policy outputs feeding specific support and indeed in a way it can be said that diffuse 
support is fed by certain psychic or symbolic outputs. (Easton [1979] p. 273) 
When comparing the circumstances of the Estonian and Hungarian transition an 
obvious and very important difference presents itself: while in Hungary the system 
change meant major changes in economic, political and social system in Estonia the 
whole transition has had an additional layer, namely, regaining national independence. 
As it has been highlighted by Vihalemm et al [1997] the first stage or the “mythological 
stage” of Estonian transition was dominated by the issue of independence from 
Moscow. Practically all Estonians were for total national independence. The period was 
characterized by large, emotionally loaded mass demonstrations, manifestations of 
national unity (song festivals, Baltic chain, etc.).Generally hopes were very high and the 
demand for national independence from the vast majority of ethnic Estonians was clear. 
Obviously independence was not the only aim: democratic political system and end of 
the soviet style command economy were all implied in the idea of an independent 
Estonian state. Yet it was clear: in order to reach these goals the first step is to reach 
independence. The fact that it did happen and that the new system was able to provide 
the most elemental demand of the political community certainly gave it an enormous 
boost of diffuse support. According to Vihalemm at al [1997] the mythical stage faded 
away soon after gaining independence and gave way to the disillusionment during the 
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institutional stage of transition. Still the reservoir of good will stemming from the 
realization of independence did not disappear. The first few years of independence were 
dedicated to the enormous task of building up a state from scratches, including the 
economy. As it has been described already in economic policy “the Estonian 
government chose the path of maximum liberalization: no tariffs, no subsidies, no 
regulated prices […], no progressive taxes, no quotas and no extensive transfer of 
income”. (Lauristin and Vihalemm [1997] p. 107) This approach undoubtedly put 
enormous burdens on the population. While disillusionment increased fast the fact that 
public sentiment did still not give rise to an alternative political force that would have 
exploited negative attitudes through populist promises signals the presence of still 
considerable diffuse support for the prevailing system and conduct of economic policy. 
An excellent example of how diffuse support - originating from positive sentiments – 
for independence did help the new regime overcome difficult economic decisions is the 
introduction of the new currency, the Kroon. Its pragmatic necessity could be well 
combined with its strong symbolic meaning: the introduction of the own currency was 
certainly regarded as an important element of independent statehood at the same time a 
useful tool of securing independence from the inflation plagued Ruble-zone, thus 
securing further Estonia’s independence from  Moscow. In order to create a strong 
national currency achieving credibility was crucial, this is the reason why the Estonian 
leadership eventually decided for the currency board arrangement despite warnings 
from the IMF that requirements for such a monetary regime might put too much strain 
on the Estonian economy. A harsh fiscal adjustment was conducted by the government, 
amounting to 5-6% of the GDP, in order to meet the requirements for the currency 
board arrangement (including VAT increase from 10 to 18%). (Knöbl et al [2002] p. 16) 
In Hungary the aim for independent statehood was obviously absent from the 
circumstances of transition. Hungary however differed in yet another aspect from other 
post-communist transition countries, also from those Central European ones that 
retained their statehood during Soviet times. A number of scholars (see for instance 
Kornai [1995] and [2005]; Inotai [2004] and Muraközy [2004] have pointed out that the 
main expectation of Hungarians from the system change was mostly materialistic, first 
and foremost an immediate improvement in standard of living and material well-being. 
After the 1956 uprising (the most severe incident against Soviet rule in the Eastern 
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Block) and the subsequent retaliation both the communist authorities and the public 
longed for peace and calm. During the following decades the authorities aimed to keep 
the population calm by constantly raising living standards. As it has been already partly 
discussed this meant that Hungary started experimenting with alternative policies in the 
economy before any other socialist country: abandoned central command in the ‘60s, 
allowed small private enterprise like entities in the ‘80s, etc. When these concessions 
proved insufficient in keeping up the pace of development the government was willing 
to finance higher living standards from foreign loans. Quite short-sited policy indeed, 
yet the regime was afraid of the consequences of falling living standards more than 
anything. Besides the economy concessions were also made in politics. The doctrine of 
the regime was “who is not against us is with us”, which was a great improvement 
compared to the more oppressive, totalitarian regime doctrine of the early ‘50s: “who is 
not with us is against us”. Of course this was not even remotely a liberal democracy, but 
at least the regime did not demand open commitment of the citizens for the system and 
if they did not “rock the boat” people could enjoy small benefits like for instance 
passport to the west every 3rd year. (Romsics [2005]) In summary, for about 25 years 
the Hungarian society lived in relative peace and material well-being unparalleled in the 
soviet block. As a consequence an illusion started to spread in the society that the 
Hungarians who managed to create the “happiest barrack” of the soviet camp are the 
most innovative, smartest, most flexible among the socialist societies. Even though the 
actual performance of the Hungarian economy was not better than that of other CEE 
countries, still instead of Czechoslovakia or Poland, Hungarians compared themselves 
to Austria and Germany. When, by the late ‘80s the crisis and the unsustainability of the 
system became apparent the main expectation from the new system was to elevate 
standard of living to that western European level many Hungarians experienced during 
their trips to the west. (Inotai [2004]). This does not mean that changes in Hungary were 
not accompanied by mass demonstrations, reemergence of national symbols and a 
general positive emotional charge, yet these were less intense than in Estonia or any 
other transition country in the region. (We will return to this issue in the next section, 
when the extreme gradual nature of the Hungarian transition will be compared to the 
swift and radical Estonian changes.) As János Kornai has put it the Hungarian 
population has already got used to the easing of repression, felt that extension of 
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political rights is natural and did not become particularly euphoric about political 
changes rather accepted it with silent satisfaction. This lack of euphoria which was 
visible even compared to Czechoslovakia or Poland had the consequence that the period 
of extraordinary politics in Hungary was much shorter than anywhere else – if existed at 
all – which was reflected in the first democratically elected government’s reluctance to 
take harsh measures. (Kornai [1995] p. 10) Later, as people realized that the standard of 
living is rather decreasing than increasing the major basis of support for the new system 
eroded very fast. Unlike in Estonia there was no other major expectation from the new 
system and once this fell, the loss in diffuse support became significant enough that in 
the subsequent two decades no government could ask the population for substantial 
sacrifices, unless was willing to risk a major political defeat.  It goes without saying that 
Estonians also expected strong improvement in their living standards. Especially in 
Northern Estonia due to Finnish TV broadcasting people had an idea about gap that 
existed between the west and Eastern Europe. However this was not the only, and not 
even the most important expectation from the system change. The aim of independent 
statehood stood above everything else and when this goal was reached the euphoric 
historic momentum, the period of extraordinary politics or reservoir of diffuse support 
was there for the Estonian government to seize the opportunity and take measures that 
were painful yet necessary. 
The relationship between expectations and reality in the two societies manifests 
itself in the difference in attitudes towards the old and the new regime. According to a 
poll conducted in 1993, out of the 10 CEE countries only in Hungary did more 
respondents think positively of the previous system than about the current one: 58% 
rated the communist system positively whereas only 50% gave positive rating to the 
current system. (New Democracies Barometer III.) In the same year only 32% of ethnic 
Estonian respondents evaluated the communist system positively, while 58% gave 
positive evaluation to the current system. These rations improved further in the 
following years and in 2006 Estonians gave the best rating for the current system in the 
whole region, while Hungarians remained the most pessimistic about the current 
system. Perhaps the best illustration to this Hungarian attitude is two state funerals in 
1989. On June 16. Imre Nagy, the central figure of the 1956 uprising, who was executed 
in 1958 by János Kádár the communist leader of Hungary between 1956 and 1989, was 
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reburied. About 300 thousand people appeared in the event which was one of the most 
illustrious momentum of transition. A few days later János Kádár himself died, 
nevertheless his coffin also drew tens of thousands of supportive people. Even more 
noteworthy that according to a contemporary poll 75% of people thought that with his 
death Hungarian politics lost one of its greatest figures. (Kurtán et al [1990] p. 454) The 
positive opinion about Kádár did not change over the years: a poll in 2005 revealed that 
he is the most popular historic figure in Hungary. (Vásárhelyi [2005]) 
The third very important aspect in the circumstances of transition is the speed 
and quality of political changes. It has been discussed that in Hungary regarding 
political changes there was a lack of euphoria even compared to states – like 
Czechoslovakia or Poland - where regaining statehood was not part of the agenda. This 
was partly due to the different expectations of the Hungarian society but also because of 
the smooth – according to some too smooth – political changes, that deprived the 
Hungarian society from the sensation that a true change is occurring. According to 
Körösényi [2009] one of the main pathologic property of Hungarian transition is its 
extreme smoothness, that – in a certain way - no symbolic political change occurred, on 
the basis of which a new political community could have emerged. It is reflected on one 
hand in the incomplete (or in some aspects totally absent) elite change on the other hand 
in the sense of continuity which was a consequence of the consensual nature of political 
change, wherein the “old guard” and representatives of the democratic opposition 
agreed about the entire political transition in roundtable talks. Kornai [1995] also notes 
that an important characteristic of the Hungarian authorities since the ‘60s has been the 
intention to avoid conflicts and secure social peace. Hence the possibility of “roundtable 
talks” that enabled for the old elite to save its positions and even gave the old system 
some sort of legitimacy in retrospective. (Körösényi [2009]) The fact that wide scale 
political changes could be conducted at through round table talks and the lack of real 
elite change has had two consequences. (1) It fed the feeling that ordinary people were 
left out of changes, that the elite in the top quietly settled everything among each other 
(2) the lack of any upheaval, the overly structured, consensual nature of changes 
suggested some sort of legal continuity with the previous system and did definitely not 
help to create the impression that great, fundamental changes are occurring. These 
effects were strengthened by the extremely gradual nature of Hungarian transition, that 
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is, reforms in the economy started as early as the ‘60s and to a lesser extent but 
oppression eased substantially also in the political sphere after 1956. By 1989 the 
Hungarian society has been through decades of waves of different reforms therefore 
changes around 1989 did not have such elemental affect on the society. According to 
Kornai [1995] this gradual change can be only compared to the Slovenian experience. 
At the time of the changes the above discussed qualities of the Hungarian 
transition seemed like a great advantage that secure Hungary’s leading position in CEE 
in the historic process of returning to Europe. However nowadays it is more often 
questioned in Hungary whether such smooth transition was indeed in the best interest of 
the country. These developments worked against a symbolic transition that could have 
created a strong we-feeling in the political community, which in turn could have 
contributed to a more intense, more lasting period of extraordinary politics. Instead the 
materialistic expectations remained the strongest basis of support for transition and 
when due to obvious reasons the new system could not live up to these expectations 
diffuse support eroded very quickly. The first democratically elected prime minister of 
Hungary, József Antall, realized this quite early on. When his fellow party members 
criticized him for not being radical enough in conducting reforms, he replied with the 
often quoted line: “You should have done a revolution!” (Homepage dedicated to József 
Antall) 
The Estonian transition was the exact opposite in both of the above discussed 
major aspects. Although the transition was calmer than in Latvia or Lithuania, where 
soviet troops killed several demonstrators it was obviously much more emotionally 
loaded than in Hungary. Actual, specific changes were reflected in a great deal of 
symbolic changes that every Estonian could understand and almost every Estonian 
agreed with. After the changes occurred everyone could feel that something 
fundamentally different started. As opposed to the gradual changes in Hungary, in 
Estonia shock therapy was applied not only in the economy but also in the political 
sphere insofar as during the transition the more radical program of the Estonian 
Congress prevailed over the program of the People’s Front, the original leader of 
reforms. As far as change of the nomenclatura is concerned Estonia went furthest in it 
among the three Baltic countries and the entire region. (Lauristin and Vihalemm [1997] 
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p. 106-107) Panagiotou [2001] also highlights this when investigating the factors 
contributing to Estonia’s transition success compared to Latvia and Lithuania. 
 
 
6.4. Summary of findings 
 
The following chart summarizes the findings of the case comparison. The arrows 
represent direction of influence: 
 
 
 
As it can be seen there are three independent variables that influence other 
characteristics of the transitions (the expectations from transition, presence/absence of 
perceived external threat and the nature of the previous regime). The expectations from 
transition can be divided into two elements: (a) Nature of the expectation or what was 
exactly the expectation (b) whether this expectation was fulfilled or not by transition?  
In case of Estonia the fact that the main expectation – independence from Moscow – 
was achieved had two major consequences: it strengthened support, political good will 
for the new regime/system and parallel with this decreased chances of nostalgia for the 
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previous system. The latter outcome was also supported by another independent 
variable, the nature of previous regime. That is in Estonia there was much less reason to 
feel nostalgic about soviet times than in Hungary due to lack of independent statehood, 
higher political repression and lower material well-being than in communist Hungary. 
As the new regime appeared more advantageous relative to the previous regime and 
since there was considerable political good will towards the new regime the period of 
extraordinary politics was stronger and lasted longer in Estonia than in Hungary, where 
the most important expectation – improving living standard – was not fulfilled, 
moreover in many respects the gap between the old and the new regime wasn’t as wide 
as in Estonia (i.e. relatively high living standard, easing political repression). 
The difference in the nature of expectations influenced the emotional intensity, 
emotional charge of the changes. In Estonia – where national independence was at stake 
- it was much more euphoric, elemental than in Hungary where aims were much more 
materialistic. The emotional intensity was also influenced by the nature of the previous 
regime insofar as the more reformist, softer Hungarian regime enabled a much 
smoother, gradual transition which lowered the emotional charge and decreased the 
sensation of symbolic changes. As a result the lower emotional charge of the changes in 
Hungary meant weaker basis for strong we-feeling, the build-up of a new political 
community. The opposite happened in Estonia and this was further supported by the 
perceived Russian threat (which factor was obviously totally absent in Hungary). The 
latter also contributed to the extension of the period of extraordinary politics in Estonia, 
as even after independence was achieved its persistence could not be taken for granted 
therefore in order to secure independence the population was willing to endure a great 
deal of difficulties. 
As it can be seen all factors in this complex system have worked towards a long 
period of extraordinary politics in Estonia, while exactly the opposite tendency can be 
observed in the case of Hungary. Furthermore the literature clearly suggests that this 
prolonged period of extraordinary politics is the main reason of the persistent consensus 
in Estonia regarding economic policy but also in other political areas. The stronger 
sense of community or we-feeling in Estonia in addition has certainly been 
advantageous for the prevailing consensus. Thus advocating alternatives, “claims for 
social justice and solidarity sounded ‘too socialist’ in the context of the dominating 
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transition culture” (Lauristin and Vihalemm [2010] p. 20), that is, the prevailing market-
liberalism. It goes without saying that consensus about small state, low level of 
redistribution is favorable environment for fiscal discipline. Moreover pursuing lax 
fiscal policies in Estonia would also mean jeopardizing the stability of the currency a 
major tool and symbol of economic independence and more recently jeopardizing the 
introduction of the Euro the final element of transition from the soviet past to Estonia’s 
European future.  
Again, the situation is very different in Hungary. There was no common basis of 
consensus upon which all major groups of the society could have agreed. In fact it is 
even questioned lately in the common discourse whether real transition indeed take 
place in Hungary. A major element of the main opposition party’s campaign before the 
2010 elections was exactly the need for a true regime change. In such environment 
where the society is characterized by the total lack of any consensus, where no taboos 
exist, political populism, the aim to win votes with short sighted promises will 
inevitably emerge. It is important to see that the difference is not in the sense of 
responsibility of politicians. The difference lies in the social and political environment 
insofar as it is politically advantageous in Hungary for any force not in power to come 
forth with populist promises, while such move is much less tempting in the Estonian 
social and political environment. 
 
 
6.5. Suggestions for operationalization 
 
The findings of the case comparison are in line with Gyırffy’s suggestion that 
consensus is crucial for fiscal discipline. It could be also seen that certain aspects of the 
Estonian transition, their lasting effects work towards stability, the persistence of this 
consensus. The only remaining question is whether these aspects or factors mentioned 
above can be identified as manifestations of diffuse support, as Gyırffy’s theory would 
suggest? This paper argues that it is possible. The definition of the period of 
extraordinary politics by itself is almost identical to Easton’s description of what diffuse 
support is. Indeed its effects suggest that it should be regarded as sign of strong diffuse 
support: the period of extraordinary politics secures necessary support for the system 
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until outputs can be generated that boost also specific support. Moreover the basis of it 
– as it could be seen in the Estonian case – is a certain emotional attachment, which 
corresponds the nature of diffuse support. The other important outcome of transition, 
the sense of community, the level of we-feeling can also be interpreted as a 
manifestation of diffuse support. While the period of extraordinary politics can be 
identified as diffuse support for the political system, the “we-feeling” – according to 
Easton – is the manifestation of diffuse support for the political community, which is 
one element of the political system. Thus, the cases of Estonia and Hungary clearly 
support Gyırffy’s suggestions. However - as it was discussed earlier in chapter five – 
Gyırffy failed to operationalize her suggestions correctly and her testing on the CEE 
region failed. Therefore – based on our results – suggestions will be given on how to 
measure diffuse support.  
If the aim is to follow Gyırffy’s footsteps than an independent variable needs to 
found that explain variation among countries in the dependent variable (average budget 
balance). Immediately we face two major problems. The first one concerns the 
dependent variable: while the performance of Estonia and Hungary regarding budget 
balance has been quite steady and predictable (that is predictably good for Estonia and 
predictably bad for Hungary) most other countries in the region have shown more 
varying performance (see chapter one). This means that average values of deficit might 
be less useful in measuring their overall performance. A solution could be to use every 
years data (increasing thus the number of cases), however that would create problem on 
the independent variable side as a major property of diffuse support is exactly its low 
volatility over short periods of time. Thus, even if the right indicator was found to 
measure diffuse support this problem is with the dependent variables questions the 
validity of the model. The other problem concerns the independent variable: since the 
societies observed here have gone through ground shaking changes during the past two 
decades of transition, the period in our focus is extremely hectic compared to other 
periods in history or compared to the same period of other countries. This means that it 
is quite hard to find indicators that have reflected fairly similar values in the same 
society throughout the period. This by the way could be one explanation why Gyırffy’s 
way of measuring diffuse support seemed to work in Western Europe, proved to be false 
when applied to CEE. The above problems already suggest that the task of 
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operationalizing diffuse support is extremely challenging. Nevertheless if we wish to 
proceed we need to take a look at the results of the case studies.  
It is obvious that the only element that appears to be adequately measurable is 
the level of nostalgia for the previous regime, or the attitude towards the old regime as 
compared to the new one. Neither the length of the period of extraordinary politics, nor 
the level of we-feeling, nor the emotional charge of changes can be easily measured. It 
is worth mentioning that our suggestion of measurement is actually in line with the 
findings of the research by Mishler and Rose, who investigated the origins of political 
trust. They have found that “the largest single influence on trust in the model is the 
extent to which people think the new regime treats citizens more or less fairly than the 
old regime”. (Mishler and Rose [2001] p. 52) Since trust is a form of diffuse support, 
more precisely it is diffuse support towards the authorities and the regime (see chapter 
five) the above result supports the suggestion of the current paper.  
In order to measure attitudes towards the new regime in relation to the old 
regime, obviously the results of opinion polls can be well utilized. It has been discussed 
earlier that opinion polls are most often not appropriate for measuring diffuse support as 
these opinions are largely influenced by most recent outputs, thus they tend to reflect 
views on specific support. The question thus arises why opinion polls about the 
assessment of the old and new regimes are suggested here to be used? Besides the above 
quoted result by Mishler and Rose [2001] the theoretical explanation could be the 
following: In conventional poll questions (that is, where opinion about a single object is 
asked without any further frame of reference) it is very hard to detach oneself from the 
daily/immediate outputs of the object in question. Yet comparison with the old regime 
puts the question into perspective, forces the respondent to consider a longer period, to 
view developments and the new system from a more general perspective.  Obviously 
the opinion about the previous regime will be very subjective, yet this is not a problem 
as we are essentially interested in the assessment of the current regime, through 
inquiring about the attitude towards the old regime. Thus, even if the condemnation or 
praise of the previous regime is very much based on subjective assessment which 
corresponds very little with the reality, it still tells us a lot about the real level of diffuse 
support for the current regime. Estonia is a good case for illustrating the difference 
between the two polls: “although people may criticize the present parliament and laugh 
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at the parties, only a very few Estonians are willing to return to anything reminiscent of 
communism”. (Lagerspetz and Vogt [2004] p. 73) It has to be noted that if we want to 
learn about diffuse support then the question should concern comparison from a 
political and not from an economic aspect. In the latter case (for instance when opinion 
about current economic situation is asked compared to the economic situation under the 
old system) answers will be again very much connected to specific outputs.    
It seems thus justified that operationalization proceeds along these lines. At this 
point however further problems arise concerning mostly the available data. Unlike in 
the case of satisfaction with democracy, where uniform Eurobarometer data is available 
on every country at least for the past 10 years, there is no comparable, yearly collected 
data available on this issue. The most promising attempt has been the New Europe 
Barometers/New Democracies Barometers and New Baltic Barometers compiled by the 
University of Aberdeen under the supervision of Richard Rose. During the past 20 years 
six or seven rounds have been completed in each country of the region. The questions in 
the individual rounds are however not entirely identical, in some years certain questions 
- crucially important from the perspective of this paper – have not been asked, moreover 
no round has been completed during the past six years, therefore the data even from 
these surveys is quite fragmented.  
Three different datasets will be used here to create an aggregate index, which 
will be then used as independent variable set. It needs to be emphasized that this index 
is created merely to see whether operationalization based on attitudes towards the old 
regime displays any promising perspective. Even if connection can be detected between 
this index and budget balance, for the above described shortcomings extensive further 
research is necessary to adequately operationalize diffuse support this way. The three 
datasets are the results of the New Democracies and the New Baltic Barometers that 
provide data on the ratings of the communist and current regimes by respondents in 
1993 (in some cases 1994) moreover the results of the 2006 EBRD survey “Life in 
Transition”. From the first two surveys those results are selected that show the 
percentage of respondents who gave positive evaluation for the communist regime. In 
the third source the question was put differently and respondents could either agree, 
disagree or give neutral answer to the statement that the political situation today is 
better than around 1989. Here, the percentage of disagreeing respondents is considered. 
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1993/94 Aggregate index
18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ Average 2006
BG 51 40 49 57 59 51,25 51,13
CZ 23 22 32 51 58 40,75 31,88
EE 32 12 23 27 18 20,00 26,00
HU 58 70 70 77 80 74,25 66,13
LV 36 21 34 34 35 31,00 33,50
LT 46 19 43 48 42 38,00 42,00
PL 38 37 45 49 42 43,25 40,63
RO 33 44 38 42 42 41,50 37,25
SK 50 24 38 40 44 36,50 43,25
SI 32 22 36 43 42 35,75 33,88
2006
Positive evaluation of previous political system*
 
*In the 2006 survey: percentage of respondents who disagree with the statement “The political 
situation in this country is better today than around 1989.” Sources: New Democracies 
Barometer, New Baltic Barometer17, EBRD ‘Life in Transition’ 2006 Survey. 
 
The second problem arises from this difference in questions. Although in all 
three surveys the question is directed towards essentially the same issue in the first two 
polls respondents could give positive evaluation two both systems while in the EBRD 
survey the agreement/disagreement dichotomy excluded such option. It means that the 
data from 1993/94 includes also those who would have not given positive evaluation to 
the communist regime if they had the choice to give positive rating only to one of the 
systems. This fact already distorts the picture, since it is assumed in our model that 
those who give positive ratings to the communist regime have such negative attitude 
towards the new system that we can speak of lack of diffuse support. If the focus was on 
positive evaluation of the current system then danger is substantially higher that specific 
outputs will be the basis of assessment even if the current system needs to be compared 
to the previous one. 
The third problem concerns the 2006 EBRD survey. Results here are broken 
down to four different age groups in each country, yet no single national average is 
given. It was therefore calculated as the average of the four age groups, wherein all 
groups had equal weights. The distortion here stems from the fact that we don’t know 
what weight to assign to each group as the age structure of the pool is not known. 
The fourth problem concerns the surveys in the Baltic countries, particularly 
Estonia and Latvia. These surveys include the large Russian-speaking populations who 
                                                 
17
 Data is presented in Rose et al [1998] and Lauristin et al [1997] 
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– for obvious reasons – have somewhat different criteria than the titular nationalities to 
evaluate the current and the previous regimes. As it was discussed in chapter six the 
Russian speaking population in Estonia (an in Latvia) is not relevant as a group for 
diffuse support and certainly not to the extent that would correspond their share of the 
population. Thus, it can be assumed that in Estonia and Latvia the surveys somewhat 
overestimate the support for communist system among the politically relevant members. 
Despite the above problems there is one strongly positive aspect of the available 
data. The three surveys basically provide data on 10 countries from two different times: 
1993/94 and 2006. When the two datasets are compared it can be seen that changes over 
these hectic 12-13 years have been relatively modest. There are of course differences 
yet the position of most countries in relation to each other is quite sable. If it is assumed 
that the two datasets are comparable and measure essentially the same thing then 
perhaps the only surprising difference is the growing nostalgia in the Czech Republic 
for the previous system: from the least approving country it moved to the lower-middle 
group, where the previous system has substantial support. 
The aggregate index is simply the average of the values from 1993/94 and 2006 
for each country. For the reasons described in chapter three, that is, the presence of 
exceptional external factors, Bulgaria will be left out. On the remaining nine countries – 
following Gyırffy’s method – a simple linear regression will be used to estimate the 
connection between support for the previous system and fiscal: 
 
Estonia 26,00 0,29%
Latvia 33,50 -1,92%
Slovenia 33,88 -2,82%
Lithuania 42,00 -3,22%
Romania 37,25 -3,36%
Poland 40,63 -4,40%
Czech Rep. 31,88 -4,69%
Slovakia 43,25 -5,45%
Hungary 66,13 -6,11%
Aggregate index
(independent var.)
Average deficit
(dependent var.)
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Results: 
 
X = Aggregate index of positive evaluation of the previous system; Y = Average deficit 
 
Y = 1.495 – 0.127X 
Sig. = 0.021 
N = 9;  R2 = 0.56 
 
The results suggest significant connection. As it can be seen many difficulties 
accompany the operationalzation of diffuse support. Even our suggestion for 
measurement is surrounded with ambiguities, at this point however this seems to be the 
most promising direction for further research. 
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7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
The case studies have shown that the main suggestions of Gyırffy’s theory are 
valid: indeed elite consensus is a major precondition of an economic policy that requires 
long-term commitment (i.e. persistent fiscal discipline). Moreover Estonian and 
Hungarian developments seem to support the notion that certain preconditions, which 
can be seen as the manifestations of diffuse support, are necessary for keeping up that 
consensus.   
These results have revealed a major new aspect in explaining why Hungary has 
been unable to pursue more prudent, more disciplined fiscal policy – like Estonia. 
Moreover the findings have two major consequences for Gyırffy’s theory: in contrary 
to its suggestions, the mechanisms described regarding EMU member states seem to be 
valid also in Central and Eastern Europe (as far as they are valid in Estonian and 
Hungarian relation), thus the area of applicability can be widened. At the same time a 
major part of the theory – its operationalization of diffuse support – seems to be invalid. 
Based on the results of the case comparison this paper has suggested an alternative way 
to measure diffuse support: quantified differences in attitude towards the old and new 
political systems. Although this alternative way of operationalization is only applicable 
in case of a specific groups of countries (post-communist transition states) it is 
suspected that based on the results of qualitative analysis of further cases it should be 
possible to suggest other alternatives that are applicable to a wider group of countries.  
At this point however still even the results of the current paper require further 
refining. On one hand data on attitudes towards the systems should be collected more 
systematically and on a wider basis, that is, attitudes should be inquired through a set of 
different questions and these questios should be the same in all countries. Moreover, 
based on our results further qualitative comparative analysis should be conducted, 
involving more countries from the region, in order to solidify the valdity of findings. 
Due to limited space this could not be accomplished within the frame of this paper. The 
first part of the paper (chapter 2 and 3) prepared ground for such further research as it 
has been proved that important preconditions exist in the region for the examination of 
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domestic factors suggested by the theory. That is, quality of fiscal rules are imprtant 
determinants of fiscal performance and the countries have faced similar external factors 
(with the exception of Bulgaria).  
As it has been mentioned in the beginning, the goal of this paper has not been to 
provide a holistic explanation for differences in fiscal performance of countries. There 
are obviously a great number of other factors that also influence budget balance. The 
current paper however highlights the importance of this additional aspect, the 
importance of diffuse support in fiscal policy, which therefore should be considered in 
models that aim to provide a holistic explanation to the phenomenon of difference in 
budget balance. Moreover the goal has not simply been to explain differences, but to 
explain persistent differences, like the one observed in the case of Estonia and Hungary. 
Neoclassical economics is less succesful in explaining such permanent differences while 
it is implied in the model that the importance of diffuse support as explanatory factor is 
growing as the period, over which persistent difference needs to be explained, is 
expanding. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Bulgaria -5,10 -15,2 -0,4 1,4 0,2 -0,3 0,6 -0,8 -0,3 1,6 1,9 3,0 0,1 1,8 -3,9
Czech Rep. -13,4 -3,3 -3,8 -5,0 -3,7 -3,7 -5,6 -6,8 -6,6 -3,0 -3,6 -2,6 -0,7 -2,7 -5,9
Estonia 1,1 -0,3 2,2 -0,7 -3,5 -0,2 -0,1 0,3 1,7 1,6 1,6 2,5 2,6 -2,7 -1,7
Latvia -1,6 -0,4 1,2 0,0 -3,9 -2,8 -2,1 -2,3 -1,6 -1,0 -0,4 -0,5 -0,3 -4,1 -9,0
Lithuania -1,6 -3,3 -11,9 -3,1 -2,8 -3,2 -3,6 -1,9 -1,3 -1,5 -0,5 -0,4 -1,0 -3,3 -8,9
Hungary -8,7 -4,3 -5,9 -7,8 -5,4 -3,0 -4,0 -8,9 -7,2 -6,4 -7,9 -9,3 -5,0 -3,8 -4,0
Poland -4,4 -4,9 -4,6 -4,3 -2,3 -3,0 -5,1 -5,0 -6,3 -5,7 -4,1 -3,6 -1,9 -3,7 -7,1
Romania -2,1 -3,7 -4,5 -3,2 -4,4 -4,7 -3,5 -2,0 -1,5 -1,2 -1,2 -2,2 -2,5 -5,4 -8,3
Slovenia -8,4 -1,1 -2,4 -2,4 -3,0 -3,7 -4,0 -2,5 -2,7 -2,2 -1,4 -1,3 0,0 -1,7 -5,5
Slovakia -3,4 -9,9 -6,3 -5,3 -7,4 -12,3 -6,5 -8,2 -2,8 -2,4 -2,8 -3,5 -1,9 -2,3 -6,8
General Government Budget Deficit/Surplus
 
Source: Eurostat, World Bank 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
The Structure of Gleich’s (Fabrizio and Mody’s) Index 
 
 
I. PREPARATION 
 
1. Existence of statutorily mandated fiscal rules  
a. Balanced budget rule 
b. Limits on public borrowing 
c. No legal limits on borrowing 
 
2. Sequence of budgetary decision-making 
a. MF sets forth aggregate and specific budget targets in initial budget 
circular 
b. MF proposes, cabinet decides on targets for budget aggregates and 
spending limits are assigned to each ministry before spending ministries 
develop budget requests 
c. MF proposes, cabinet decides on targets for budget aggregates before 
spending ministries develop budget requests 
d. Budgetary targets are set on the basis of preliminary budget requests 
e. No budget targets are determined 
 
3. Compilation of the draft budget  
a. Finance ministry holds bilateral negotiations with each spending 
ministry 
b. Finance ministry only collects budget requests and compiles summary 
for cabinet session 
 
4. Members of executive responsible for reconciling conflicts over budget bids 
a. MF or PM can veto or overrule cabinet decision 
b. Senior cabinet committee, then whole council of ministers or cabinet 
c. Executive collectively (e.g. council of ministers or cabinet) 
 
II. LEGISLATION 
 
5. Relative power of the upper house vis-a-vis the lower house (not included in 
Fabrizio and Mody’s index) 
a. No budgetary power vested in upper house or unicameral parliament 
b. Lower house has prerogatives 
c. Both houses have equal rights (e.g. joint sittings) 
 
6. Constraints on the legislature to amend the government’s draft budget 
a. Deficit provided in the draft budget cannot be exceeded, or individual 
amendments have to indicate offsetting changes 
b. No restrictions 
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7. Sequence of votes 
a. Initial vote on total budget revenues, expenditures, and the deficit 
b. Final vote on budget aggregates 
 
8. Relative power of the executive vis-a-vis the parliament 
a. Cabinet can combine a vote of confidence with a vote on the budget 
b. Draft budget is executed if parliament fails to adopt the budget before 
the start of the fiscal year 
c. Parliament can be dissolved if it fails to adopt the budget in due time 
  
9. Authority of the national president in the budget procedure 
a. No special authority 
b. President has veto right (president elected by parliament) 
c. President has veto right (president directly elected by citizens) 
d. President has veto right (qualified majority required to override veto) 
 
III. IMPLEMENTATION 
 
10. Flexibility to change budget aggregates during execution 
a. Any increase in total revenues, expenditures and the deficit needs to be 
approved by the parliament in a supplementary budget 
b. Revenue windfalls can be used to increase expenditure without the 
approval of the parliament as long as the deficit is not increased 
c. Simultaneous changes in revenues and expenditures allowed without 
approval of parliament if budget balance is not changed 
d. At discretion of government 
 
11. Transfers of expenditures between chapters (i.e. ministries’ budgets) 
a. Require approval of parliament 
b. FM or cabinet can authorize transfers between chapters 
c. Limited 
d. Unrestricted 
 
12. Carry-over of unused funds to next fiscal year 
a. Not permitted 
b. Only if provided for in initial budget or with finance ministry approval 
c. Limited 
d. Unlimited 
 
13. Procedure to react to a deterioration of the budget deficit (due to unforeseen 
revenue     shortfalls or expenditure increases) 
a. MF can block expenditures 
b. The cabinet can block expenditures 
c. Approval of the parliament necessary to block expenditures 
d. No action is taken 
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
The Constituents of Hallerberg and Yläoutinen’s Index 
 
 
“CONTRACTS” INDEX (PLURALITY ELECTORAL SYSTEMS) 
 
 
Long-term Planning Constraint 
 
a. Is there a multi-annual target in place? 
b. Length of time-horizon 
c. Nature of budget forecasts 
d. Degree of commitment to multi-annual fiscal targets 
 
 
“DELEGATION” INDEX (PROPORTIONAL ELECTORAL SYSTEMS) 
 
 
Structure of negotiations in cabinet 
 
a. Is there general constraint on the budget? 
b. Agenda setting power of finance minister 
c. Broadness of the budget norms (Are there more specific targets in 
addition to general ones?)  
d. Structure of budget negotiations 
 
Strength of Finance Minister 
 
a. Does the finance minister have special power in budgetary issues? 
 
Structure of the parliamentary process 
 
a. Are amendment possibilities by the parliament limited? 
b. What consequence has loosing budget vote? (e.g. vote of confidence?) 
c. Can amendments cause the fall of the government? 
d. Sequence of vote on budget in parliament (first voting on total size or 
not?) 
 
Flexibility of budget execution 
 
a. Can the fin. min. block expenditure? 
b. Can the fin. min. impose cash limits? 
c. Disbursements must be approved before spent? 
d. Possibility of transferring funds between chapters 
e. Possibility of carrying over unused funds to next year 
f. Are changes to budget law allowed during execution stage? 
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APPENDIX D 
 
 
Data used by Dóra Gyırffy in the framework theory 
 
 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Austria 60 64 56 63 72 65 64 68
Belgium 28 49 60 63 70 65 62 65
Finland 50 67 64 62 71 77 77 77
France 39 59 60 58 59 68 55 53
Germany 50 66 54 61 66 59 51 53
Greece 33 62 53 48 53 49 64 53
Ireland 75 74 70 73 69 66 70 71
Italy 28 34 36 38 34 38 35 44
Luxembourg 79 83 74 75 79 80 80 82
Portugal 35 57 50 37 35 37 31 41
Spain 50 71 75 64 70 58 65 67
Netherlands 75 78 80 71 66 70 64 71
Satisfaction with democracy*
 
 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005
Czech Rep. 42 41 43 48
Estonia 32 32 30 44
Hungary 55 33 31 27
Latvia 37 40 35 44
Lithuania 36 37 29 24
Poland 28 23 16 29
Slovakia 19 17 18 26
Slovenia 45 50 43 56
Satisfaction with democracy* 
 
 
* Share of respondents that is either “very satisfied” or “fairly satisfied” with democracy. 
Source: Gyırffy [2007] quoting Eurobarometer survey results from the corresponding years.  
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APPENDIX E 
 
Results of Parliamentary Elections 
 
Party % of Votes Party % of Votes
Isamaa 22 MDF 24,73
Kindel Kodu 13,6 SZDSZ 21,39
Rahvarinne 12,25 FKGP 11,73
Mõõdukad 9,73 MSZP 10,89
ERSP 8,79 FIDESZ 8,95
Eesti Kodanik 6,89 KDNP 6,46
Sõltumatud Kuningriiklased 7,12
Eesti Ettevõtjate Erakond 2,39
Rohelised 2,62 Party % of Votes
MSZP 32,99
SZDSZ 19,73
Party % of Votes MDF 11,73
Koonderakonna ja Maarahva Liidu Ühendus 32,23 FKGP 8,82
Reformierakond 16,19 KDNP 7,03
Keskerakond 14,17 FIDESZ 7,01
Isamaa ja ERSP 7,86
Mõõdukad 5,99
Meie Kodu On Eestimaa 5,87 Party % of Votes
Parempoolsed 5 MSZP 32,92
FIDESZ 29,48
FKGP 13,15
Party % of Votes SZDSZ 7,57
Keskerakond 23,41 MIÉP 5,47
Reformierakond 15,92
Isamaa 16,09
Mõõdukad 15,21 Party % of Votes
Eesti Maarahva Erakond 7,27 MSZP 42,05
Koonderakond 7,58 FIDESZ-MDF 41,07
Eesti Ühendatud Rahvapartei 6,13 SZDSZ 5,57
Party % of Votes Party % of Votes
Keskerakond 25,4 MSZP 43,21
ResPublica 24,6 FIDESZ-KDNP 42,03
Reformierakond 17,7 SZDSZ 6,5
Rahvaliit 13 MDF 5,04
Isamaa 7,3
Mõõdukad 7
Party % of Votes
FIDESZ-KDNP 52,73
Party % of Votes MSZP 19,3
Reformierakond 27,8 Jobbik 16,67
Keskerakond 26,1 LMP 7,48
Pro Patria and Res Publica 17,9
Estonian Social Democratic Party 10,6
Rohelised 7,1
Rahvaliit 7,1
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      Source: Vabariigi Valimiskomisjon; Országos Választási Iroda 
